

Transformation of the German Right and Unbundling of Conservative Attitudes

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Abstract

Strong center-right parties play important role in democracies because they integrate forces that could potentially contest democratic order and encourage their cooperation with more moderate factions. Recently, however, a number of once powerful European center-right parties suffered losses and became exposed to increasing pressure from the populist radical right. A historical defeat of German Christian Democrats at the 2021 Bundestag election demonstrates that even most successful center-right parties are affected by the symptoms of crisis.

Gidron and Ziblatt (2019: 29) identify “unbundling” of conservative attitudes as the underlying social process responsible for the problems experienced currently by the center-right. Drawing on Pardos-Prado (2015) and on Gidron (2022), this study argues that such a development is a product of misalignment between the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimension of electoral competition. According to this argument the alignment of economic and cultural conservative attitudes is beneficial for center-right while discrepancy between the two aids populist radical right parties.

Using the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) data for the Federal Elections 2009, 2013, 2017 and 2021 I estimate regression models, which present evidence speaking for the symptoms of gradual emergence of the aforementioned types of realignment in the German context. Empirical results provide an answer to a question why a third viable competitor could rise next to two long-existing center-right groupings, the CDU/CSU and the FDP. Christian Democrats have traditionally attracted individuals positioning themselves to the right of the center both in the economic and in the socio-cultural dimension while Liberals appealed more to “market cosmopolitans”. The AfD initially drew support from voters with similar combination of positions to those who supported the CDU/CSU. It became successful, however, only after it managed to reach out to a group combining critical attitudes towards migration with support for the expansion of the welfare state, referred to by Gidron (2022) as “welfare chauvinists”.

In the study I examine in more detail the mechanism behind the observed effect. I focus in particular on two explanations, the first theorizes that the AfD’s strategy was successful due to structural changes, .i.e. growing number of “welfare chauvinists”. The second explanation assumes a relatively constant distribution of a mix of socio-cultural and socio-economic attitudes and attributes rise of a third viable party on the right to changes in sorting of the electorate. It hence demonstrates the relevance of the supply-side factors.

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Introduction

The 2021 German Bundestag election marks not only the end of the tenure of Angela Merkel, but is also another critical moment in the evolution of the German party system. It is characterized among other things on the one hand by the consolidation of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and on the other by the diminishing potential of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU).

Programmatic profile of the AfD and characteristics of its voters have been intensively analyzed in a number of research articles. They come to conclusion that the AfD is not only a Eurosceptic, but also a right-wing populist party (Lewandowsky et al. 2016), however at least in the early phase of its existence it was not classified as “radical right” (Arzheimer 2015). Jankowski et al. (2016) find that in 2013 the candidates of the AfD were in fact more market liberal but not more authoritarian than candidates of the CDU. Following the 2013 election xenophobic motives were gaining relevance for AfD supporters while issues related to economy and the European Union were becoming less important (Schmitt-Beck 2017: 124). A major change came in the aftermath of the migration crisis in 2015, which became clearly visible during the 2017 election. With respect to socio-demographic characteristics voters of the AfD did not differ much from voters of other German parties in 2017, but were rather distinguished by their anti-immigrant and anti-elite attitudes (Hansen and Olsen 2019). Pesthy et al. (2021) address differences between support for the AfD in Eastern and Western Germany and find higher level of nativist and populist attitudes among party’s East German voters.

Arzheimer and Berning (2019) summarize the observations made by previous authors and provide a comprehensive and insightful analysis of transformation of the AfD. They address in particular the evolution of policy positions and of the electorate of the AfD between 2013 and 2017 and come to the conclusions that the effect of ideology on the vote of the AfD increased over time. This can be attributed to the change of the AfD from a protest party into a party which took ownership of the immigration issue and strengthened its nativist profile. Furthermore, the AfD clearly ceased to appeal to market liberals after its leaders associated with this position left. It gave up an attempt to set foot in the niche occupied in the German context primarily by the FDP.

Less has been said about what distinguishes the AfD voters from voters of mainstream center-right parties. Several studies focus on the role of religiosity in explaining the AfD support (Siegers and Jedinger 2021; Dilling 2018) and identify discrepancies between the electorate of German Christian-Democrats and of the AfD. In spite of differences in specific findings, these studies come in general to conclusion that religiosity tends to immunize voters against support populist radical right parties. Steinmann (2022), on the other hand, argues that the mechanism is more complicated. In some instances Christian religiosity can decrease, the probability of voting for populist radical right, in others it can increase it. What distinguishes these two types of voters is the type of interpretation of Christianity. Those who understand it in exclusive manner more often fear that they are endangered by their social change and turn to populist radical right parties who address these fears. The voters who have a more inclusive understanding of Christianity do not share this fears and are immunized against appeals of populist radical right parties. Then, Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville (2021) focus on the supply side and demonstrate in their comparative analysis that the negative effect of church attendance on vote share of populist radical right parties is strongest in countries with strong Christian-democratic parties. This corresponds with the finding that religiosity and affiliation with the Catholic church are still perceived as important determinants of the vote for the German Christian Democrats and identifying with the CDU or the CSU in spite of the ongoing secularization (Roßteutscher 2012; Arzheimer 2012).

Another strand of literature focuses on the role of cross-pressures in the success of populist radical right parties. The concept of cross-pressures was introduced by Lazarsfeld (1944: 56) who defines them

as combination of voter's characteristics (I would add attitudes) which "work in the opposite direction", i.e. some of them "pressure" a voter to support one party while others would rather suggest she should vote another party. Pardos-Prado (2015) shows that the mainstream parties can successfully compete against right-wing populists "when immigration party positions are correlated with broader economic and cultural dimensions of competition". This is, however, less and less often the case. Furthermore, even if German policy space has long included a second dimension besides the economic left-right, it has long lacked a party positioned in the left-authoritarian quadrant of the policy space prior to the shift of the AfD in this direction (Hillen and Steiner 2020: 339). Gidron (2021) emphasizes the crucial role of voters holding a mix of progressive attitudes on one dimension of party competition and conservative on the other. He identifies two types of such cross-pressured voters and refer to them as welfare chauvinists and market cosmopolitans. They can be distinguished from consistent conservatives and consistent progressives. Gidron (2021: 149) formulates concrete expectations with respect to the mainstream center-right parties as he states that "compared to other right-of-center-parties, center-right parties are likely to be less appealing to cross-pressured voters."

The aim of the following text is to connect the aforementioned strands of literature, primarily the analysis of changing profile of AfD and characteristics of its voters over time and the studies on the role of cross-pressures in weakening of the mainstream right. The rest of the text will be structured as follows. First, I will explain the theoretical foundations of the analysis. This includes clarification of crucial concepts and formulating theoretical expectations which will guide the empirical analysis. In the next chapter the data used in the analysis and methods applied are presented. The following section focuses on descriptive analysis in order to evaluate the extent of the changes at the political demand side, i.e. concerning the electorate. Then I turn to the empirical analysis of the relationship between a measure of cross-pressures and voting behavior for main German parties between 2013 and 2017 to understand better if and how cross-pressures can explain the weakening of the center right co-occurring with the rise and the consolidation of the populist radical right in Germany. The final section offers a conclusion and reflection on the relevance of the empirical findings for the scientific debate.

Supply- and Demand-Centered Pathways to Transformation of Center-Right

As observed by Bale and Rovira Kaltwasser (2021: 5) "mainstream right parties are undergoing significant and (...) fascinating transformations, not least as they confront an ever more serious challenge from the populist radical right." At the electoral level they are in particular challenged by the contrasting tendencies taking the form of a shift towards liberal, progressive, green or postmaterialist values on the one hand and growing popularity of the authoritarian and nativist ideas on the other. This process occurs within the context of global process of political realignment associated with changes of the cultural cleavage (Dalton 2018: 3). One of the symptoms of this process is the increasing relevance of the cultural conflict dimension as compared to the economic dimension which was the main underlying dimension of Western European party competition in past. The two dimensions are becoming less aligned with each other increasing the possibility of emergence of new parties representing the mixture of "progressive" and "conservative" positions which have rarely occurred before such as e.g. parties representing left-authoritarian positions (Hillen and Steiner 2020).

The increasing divergence between the socio-economic and socio-cultural conflict dimension contributes to the increasing heterogeneity in particular in the group of parties positioned to the right of political center. This is so because as argued by Gidron (2022: 149) the group of cross-pressured

voters, whose relevance and number increases due to socio-demographic changes “view issues on which they are conservative as more salient to their vote choice”. These issues are immigration, a core topic for European right-wing populist parties in case of “welfare chauvinists” and free market economy with respect to the second group referred to as “market cosmopolitans” (Gidron 2022: 149). It is for that reason important to reflect first upon the meaning of the concept of political right and its different aspects.

Both the mainstream center-right and populist radical right parties position themselves to the right of the center of policy space, but what does it mean? The political “right” seems to be less clearly defined than the political “left”. As observed by Gidron and Ziblatt (2019: 20) there “is no consensus in the literature regarding a minimal definition of the electoral right”. The roots of this fuzziness go back to the French Revolution when concepts of political left and right were born. Whereas the term “left” referred to progressives championing change under the banner of liberty, equality and fraternity, there was less clarity about the ideals of political right. The universe of center-right or right wing parties is therefore characterized by large degree of heterogeneity and populated by party families with different programmatic profiles including “Christian democrats, agrarians, conservatives, the radical right, and liberals” (Gidron and Ziblatt 2019: 20). In spite of this heterogeneity, however, (center-) right parties seem to share certain characteristics such as cross-class appeals to religion and national identity (Gidron and Ziblatt 2019: 27), different degree of endorsement of market economy as well as representation of rural interests (e.g. Ignazi and Wellhofer 2013).

According to Bale and Rovira Kaltwasser (2021) the distinction between left and right is primarily about their attitude towards equality and diverging opinions concerning the question whether inequalities existing in a society should be alleviated or not. One may add, however, that the approach to inequality in economic and in non-economic sphere may be expected to diverge if the two dimensions of party competition become increasingly disjunct over time.

At the second level, within the cluster of parties positioned to the right of the political center Bale and Rovira Kaltwasser (2021) distinguish between mainstream right and far right and identify some “level of disloyalty to (liberal) democracy” (Bale and Rovira Kaltwasser 201: 16) as the main characteristic of the latter. In case of populist radical right it usually takes the form of “weak commitment to certain rules of the game such as basic civil and political rights” (Bale and Rovira Kaltwasser 2021: 17) as opposed to extreme right which openly rejects democracy and promotes violence. The distinction between radical right and extreme right is the third level of classification. I will focus here on the former category represented in Germany by the AfD due to its greater political relevance.

Among mainstream right parties, on the other hand, three party families are identified, Christian democrats, conservatives and liberals (Bale and Rovira Kaltwasser 2021: 9; Gidron and Ziblatt 2019). In this study I will propose and test propositions related to the effects one can expect to observe with respect to different types of cross-pressured voters and they propensity to vote for three major German parties positioned to the right of the center of the policy space, the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the AfD at different points in time. I prefer to speak of propositions instead of hypotheses, because they are more broadly formulated than classical causal hypotheses.

In Germany the Christian Democratic Union and its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) are clearly members of the Christian democratic party family. The conservative party family is not represented by any mainstream party, but one may argue its main characteristics, which are quite broadly defined (compare Bale and Rovira Kaltwasser 2021: 13) can apply also to the CDU/CSU. The Free Democratic Party (FDP) is a classical liberal party combining in its programmatic support for free market economy with a certain degree of cultural liberalism. Finally, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is the most successful populist radical right party in Germany in the post-war period. Below I will

formulate theoretical propositions with respect to the type of voters I expect to support each of these three parties at three most recent Bundestag elections.

The theoretical expectations formulated in this study draw primarily on work by Gidron (2021) and Padros-Prado (2015) who identify misalignment of socio-cultural and socio-economic dimension of party competition as one of the most important sources of decomposition of a coalition of voters behind center-right and ensuing transformation of right-of-the center parties. At the individual level the aforementioned condition of “misalignment” is reflected by existence of cross-pressures (Lazarsfeld 1944). A cross-pressured voter combines a set of positions on the socio-economic dimension associated with one end of the left-right scale with a set of positions on the socio-cultural dimension associated with the opposite end of the left-right scale. Gidron (2021) identifies two types of cross-pressured voters which are of relevant for this analysis, “market cosmopolitans” and “welfare chauvinists”.

Market cosmopolitans combine opposition to welfare state considered as typical for the right-wing parties with positive attitudes towards migration. The second type, labelled as welfare chauvinists, support expansion of the welfare state and at the same time are highly critical about allowing individuals from other countries to settle down in a country where they live. Besides them one can identify voters with preferences which are consistent between the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimension. These are either consistent conservatives or consistent progressives whose positions on the socio-cultural and the socio-economic dimension of politics are aligned in conventional manner. This means that they hold both pro-welfare and pro-migration (progressives) or both anti-welfare and anti-migration (conservatives) attitudes. In sum, the literature identifies four ideal types of voters with respect to different combinations of their issue attitudes: (1) consistent progressives, (2) consistent conservatives, (3) welfare chauvinists, (4) market cosmopolitans. Gidron (2021) demonstrates that besides consistent conservatives also the two cross-pressured groups identify rather with political right than the left.

Drawing on the aforementioned distinction between four ideal types of voters two explanations for the rise of radical right and decomposition of center right can be proposed. The first one assumes that it is merely a consequence of change in the composition of the electorate. If the share of welfare chauvinists increased over time at the expense of one or two other groups identifying themselves with political right, then we may assume that this generated demand for new political actors met by a supply of a new populist radical right party. This explanation can be referred to as structural or Downsian, since it follows the logic of economic theory of politics going back to Downs (1957). As a result of shift in the attitudes of the electorate a new niche opens which is then filled by a new political entrepreneur (compare Markowski and Tucker 2010). The consequence of this shift in the attitudes for center-right parties would be the outflow of some section of its electorate, who transfer their support to a new party which is better tailored to their political preferences than a big-tent center-right party. As a consequence the two groups of voters part their ways and broad center-right milieu decomposes. The Downsian explanation emphasizes the relevance of the political demand side.

The decomposition of center-right is, however, conceivable without emergence of a new niche. Voters holding certain attitudes can just change allegiance. It may be sufficient for the coalition without rising numbers of a given type of voter. For that, however, the existence of an organization that may accommodate the demands of this group of voters better than other organizations would be necessary. This explanation hence is rather supply-oriented and sees the origin of the phenomenon on the supply side of politics. The history of the AfD makes such a development plausible. As shown by Arzheimer and Berning (2019) the AfD underwent a major evolution over the course of its relatively short existence. It started as “as an outfit that combined soft euroscepticism with economic liberalism

and socially conservative policies” (Arzheimer and Berning 2019: 1; Arzheimer 2015) before the 2013 Bundestag election. Then in 2015 in the aftermath of the migration crisis it adopted a clearly populist stance and began to focus above all on issues related to immigration. According to this line of reasoning the AfD did not emerge in the first place in response to the demand of welfare chauvinists, but it offered an institutional framework which was at some point “hijacked” by the proponents of catering to the demands of this group of the electorate, which was at the margins of a larger center-right coalition. As observed by Gidron (2021: 147) “welfare chauvinists also tend to identify with the right where and when a radical right party is not available.” The growing dissatisfaction of this cross-pressured section of the former large center-right coalition made their representatives look for alternatives. The process of sorting the supporters created the critical mass, which made the change possible and resulted in the exit from the AfD of those who could impede settling down a promising niche, i.e. in case of the AfD market liberals and representatives of mainstream conservative elites. These in turn was an adaptation which was welcomed by the electorate and guaranteed survival of the party, albeit with a changed ideological profile.

Gidron (2022: 149) hypothesizes that “compared to other right-of-center parties, center-right parties are likely to be less appealing to cross-pressured voters”. Drawing on that my expectation is that the CDU/CSU should be initially equally attractive to different types of right-of-center voters, which suggests lack of significant effect of welfare chauvinism on probability of voting for the CDU/CSU. This may be expected since no substantive change of the CDU/CSU policy positions could be observed over time. In case of the AfD, on the other hand, there was a substantive change of policy positions over time. The party evolved from being rather pro-free-market and conservative to being strongly anti-migration and more pro-welfare-states. It may hence be expected that the AfD after having initially a similar profile to the CDU/CSU with respect to being attractive for individuals placed at different positions on the welfare chauvinism index, should appeal more to welfare chauvinist over time. Hence I expect to find in 2017 and in 2021 statistically significant positive relationship between respondent’s welfare chauvinism score and probability of voting for the AfD. Finally, in case of the FDP I expect the negative effect of welfare chauvinism in all three elections. The Liberals should attract substantively more market cosmopolitans than welfare chauvinist in all three elections.

If the aforementioned pattern of relationship between welfare chauvinism and vote for the CDU/CSU and the AfD is found, it may suggest that the AfD managed to bite into the coalition behind the Christian Democrats and deprive it of its pro-welfare anti-immigrant section. This would hence speak for the new sorting of the electorate even if no structural change among attitudes of voters is found.

Based on the aforementioned discussion I formulate the following propositions. **(P1)** First, center-right parties which belong either to Christian-democratic or to conservative party family are supported primarily by consistent conservatives, I hence expect to find no effect of cross-pressure index in the case. This refers primarily to the CDU/CSU in the German case. **(P2)** Second, populist radical right parties focus primarily on migration, we may hence expect them to attract all groups of voters who take strong anti-migration stance. This may include both consistent conservatives with extremely negative attitudes towards migration and welfare and welfare chauvinists. As a result I expect that holding more negative attitudes towards migration than towards welfare state should increase the propensity to vote for the AfD, but only in the period after the AfD abandoned its economically libertarian (anti-welfare) positions and focused primarily on migration). In practice it means that I expect to find positive relationship between the value of the cross-pressure index (since higher values stand for being more against migration than against welfare) and the probability of voting for the AfD in the Bundestag elections 2017 and 2021. **(P3)** Third, the opposite effect can be logically expected in case of the FDP. Since, the FDP is a classical liberal party combining market liberalism with relatively progressive positions in the cultural dimension, it should be a first choice of market liberals. If this is

the case, I expect to find a negative relationship between the welfare chauvinism index and the probability of voting for the FDP, because lower values of the index suggest that a respondent has more critical approach towards the welfare state as compared to her approach towards migration. (P4) Fourth, the representatives of progressive (or leftist) parties, the SPD, die Linke and the Greens, should consistently attract voters who take a progressive stand both with respect to the economic and the cultural dimensions, i.e. they are in favor of both welfare state expansion and migration. These makes them similar to the mainstream right with respect to the expected effect of cross-pressure index, I expect to find none.

Data and Methods

The analysis uses GLES data sets collected on account of the 2013, 2017 and 2021 Bundestag elections. Three specifications of the multinomial regression models are estimated. The first, basic model, includes gender, church attendance, estimate of respondent's own economic situation, education, satisfaction with democracy, centered age variable and squared centered age as well as the independent variable of core interest, the welfare chauvinism index. The second model includes additionally a variable distinguishing between respondents residing in Eastern (former GDR) and Western Germany. Then, the third model includes also an interaction between welfare chauvinism and the West dummy.

In 2017 and 2021 data sets exists a variable which not only distinguishes between federal states which belonged to the former GDR or not, but also meticulously allocates neighborhoods of Berlin to either East or West. This variable is missing in the 2013 data, so a less precise variable was used which identifies all respondents from Berlin as residing in Eastern Germany.

The dependent variable is the intended party vote in a given election with respect to the second (proportional tier) vote of the German mixed member proportional representation system. The independent variable of crucial theoretical relevance is a continuous measure of cross-pressures with respect to migration and welfare. Its operationalization is similar to the one proposed by Gidron (2022: 151) who in turn follows Baldassari and Goldberg (2014). The welfare chauvinism index used here is defined as a difference between economic and cultural attitudes. With respect to socio-cultural dimension I focus on immigration which is identified as its crucial aspect (Padros-Prado 2015: 353) as is a common denominator for the programmatic of most populist radical right parties. Opposition to immigration is furthermore as argued by the literature rather culturally than economically motivated. (Hainmüller and Hiscox 2007).

In practice it means that the value of respondent's position on an 11-point scale with 1 anti-welfare and 11 pro-welfare is subtracted from her position on an 11-point scale where 1 stands for strong pro-migration and 11 for strong anti-migration attitudes. Hence, respondents who are both in favor of migration and in favor of welfare will be coded with index values close to zero. The same will be true of respondents who strongly oppose migration and strongly oppose welfare state expansion. These two groups can be considered as examples of voters whose attitudes on both dimensions are aligned with each other as expected by the classical pattern. The cross-pressured voters whose scores are strongly negative are sometimes referred to as market cosmopolitans. They are in favor of migration (low score on migration scale) and against welfare (high score on welfare scale). The other group referred to in the literature as market chauvinists will get high positive index values, because they combine negative attitude towards migrants (high score on migration scale) with positive attitude towards welfare state (high score on the welfare scale).

Demand-Side Analysis: Is Welfare Chauvinism Gaining Ground?

Before explaining the relationship between welfare chauvinism and party vote it is necessary to estimate the extent of the phenomenon of welfare chauvinism and its change over time. Based on the data from the European Values Survey (EVS) collected in 10 Western European countries in two waves, 1990-1993 and 2017 Gidron (2022: 152) observes a substantive increase both in the share of welfare chauvinists and welfare cosmopolitans. The analysis using GLES data does not confirm this in the German case.

The mean value of the welfare cross-pressure index has been continuously declining over the course of four most recent elections. In 2009 it amounted to 1,3 in 2013 1, in 2017 0.7 and 0.3 in 2021. Positive values of the index mean that a respondent's score on welfare scale is higher than her score on the migration scale, she is hence more anti-migration than could be expected based on her position towards welfare. The opposite is true in case of negative values of the cross-pressure index. A respondent with a negative index score is more pro-migration than could be expected based in her position towards welfare. These values do not tell us, however, much about the overall position of the respondent, but rather indicate the relative direction of the cross-pressure and how it changed over time. We may conclude from these values that (1) respondents tend to be in general more pro-welfare and anti-migration relative to their positions on wither of the other dimension, and that (2) this tendency is becoming weaker over time.

To say more about share of the electorate representing a given type of voter it is necessary to take into consideration respondent's position on economic and cultural dimension separately. Both Hillen and Steiner (2019: 340) and Gidron (2021: 150) classify respondents into four quadrants using the 60th and the 40th percentile of each scale as cut-off points. I deviate from this approach to account for the possibility that a respondent may also exhibit centrist positions on each dimension. Furthermore, in case of GLES data the questions on welfare and on migration attitudes use odd number of response categories creating. They have thus a clear median response placed in the center of distribution which may attract significant portion of respondents. Selecting a different response than a centrist position on either of the categories leads to classification of a respondent as one of four ideal types proposed by Hillen and Steiner (2019). (1) Market cosmopolitans are respondents who are closer to pro-migration end of the scale (>6) and to the anti-welfare end of the scale (<6) than centrists. The welfare chauvinists oppose migration (<6) and support welfare (>6). Consistent progressives are more pro-welfare (>6) and more pro-migration (>6) than centrists or they are centrists with respect to one of the dimensions and deviate from the middle category on the other one. Consistent conservatives are the opposite of the latter, they are more anti-welfare (<6) and more anti-migration (<6) than consistent centrists or are centrists with respect to one of the dimensions and deviate in the progressive direction with respect to the other.

If we accept the aforementioned definitions of five ideal types of voters as far as their status with respect to cross-pressure is concerned, we find that the share of welfare chauvinists increased from 8.7 % to 10.8 % between 2009 and 2013 and has remained relatively stable since then. The share of market cosmopolitans, on the other hand, dropped 20.9 % in 2009 and 20.5 % in 2013 to 14 % in 2017 and 10.1 % in 2021. Consistent progressives were the most frequently observed category in in all four election years. Their share varied from 48.9 % in 2009, 41.9 % in 2013, 41.6 % in 2017 and 42 % in 2021. The only group, which has grown over time were, surprisingly, consistent conservatives. Their number increased from 17.5 % in 2009 to 21.4% in 2013, 26.9 % in 2017 and reached 31.8 % in 2021. The share of consistent centrists remained roughly similar over time.

We may draw the following conclusions from the descriptive analysis. First, since the value of the cross-pressure index is in all election years positive, it means that respondents are in general more pro-welfare than pro migration, independent of which ideal type they represent. Second, the decreasing value of the index means that the divergence between their positions on welfare and on migration decreases. This coincides with development of more pro-migration attitudes between 2009 and 2021 (7.7, 7.2, 6.8, 6.5) while attitudes on welfare have remained roughly similar (6.3, 6.1, 6.1, 6.2). Third, these changes did not affect the number of welfare chauvinists, which increased between 2009 and 2013 and has remained stable since then, while the share of market cosmopolitans exhibit a declining trend. In sum, there is no evidence that the share of cross-pressured voters is increasing. On the contrary, both the cross-pressure index indicating the relative deviation from one's position and the percentage of individuals classified as cross-pressured types with respect to the absolute value of their positions show point rather in the opposite direction (except for welfare chauvinists between 2009 and 2013).

Results of the initial analysis suggest that the crisis of center-right in Germany reflected by 2021 federal election results cannot be simply explained by changes at the level of the electorate. The measure used here is simple and not perfect, but it is consistent over four elections and focuses on most important aspects of the cultural and the economic dimension, attitudes towards migration and attitudes towards welfare and taxes. It is possible that an increase in share of welfare chauvinists described by Gidron can also be observed in Germany over longer period of time, but within the twelve years between the 2009 and 2021 Bundestag election I find no evidence of such a development in spite of dramatic changes in patterns of party composition, especially with respect to center-right. If no structural change at the level of the electorate occurred, then it is possible that the phenomena observed at the party level result from different sorting of electorate, which came as a response to emergence of a new party. We must apparently look for explanations not on the demand, but on the supply side of politics.

It seems hence that it is not the increasing number of welfare chauvinists that drives the support the decomposition of the German center right. The change in distribution of consistent versus cross-pressured voters was not that mattered most, but rather the re-grouping of the societal base of center-right parties. As summed up by Gidron (2021: 147) while "center-right parties traditionally absorbed the support of many welfare chauvinists (...) these voters are now increasingly represented by the radical right."

Empirical Analysis: Cross-Pressures and Party Preferences

I will focus here primarily on the model 2 estimated for three federal elections which were contested by all three right-of-the-center parties in question, the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the AfD. These are the 2013, 2017 and 2021 Bundestag elections. I will examine effects within a given group of parties for which specific theoretical expectations were formulated and discuss how these effects changed over time. Model 2 seems most relevant for the analysis, since it on the one hand includes a variable distinguishing between East and West German respondents, but on the other does not include an interaction between the cross-pressure index and East-West dummy which simplifies the interpretation of the theoretically relevant effects. In the second step I complement the analysis by adding a discussion of the model 3 which includes the interaction effects. The advantage of the third model is the ability to disentangle the effect observed in Western Germany from the one found in the

East. Due to underrepresentation of some of the parties in either of the regions, however, (e.g. Greens in the East) one should be cautious while interpreting these results though.

Figures with predicted probabilities of voting for a given party make it possible to get the first impression whether the direction of the effects corresponds with theoretical expectations. Average marginal effects were displayed in the Figure 2. They make it clear whether a given effect of cross-pressures on voting decisions is significant at 95% (black caps) or 90% (grey caps) level. Figure 3 summarizes the effect observed for the CDU/CSU. The most striking feature of the three graphics, which are identically scaled, is a sizable decline in the percentage of voters among all groups with respect to the values of the cross-pressure index between 2017 and 2021. Beyond that, it seems that the effect of positioning on the cross-pressure scale was rather weak in 2013 and 2017, while in 2021 it became more pronounced as indicated by steeper slope of the regression line. In all three elections Christian Democrats seemed to have attracted more voters occupying more conservative positions with respect to the cultural dimension (i.e. exhibiting more anti-immigrant attitudes) as compared to the position on economic axis. The analysis of average marginal effects (Figure 2) suggest that in 2013 and in 2017 the effect of cross-pressures on voting for Christian-Democrats was as suggested by Proposition 1 not statistically significant. It means that in spite of the slight tilt towards welfare chauvinists, the CDU/CSU was probably most favored by less-cross-pressured voters. This corresponds with conclusions reached by Pardos-Prado (2015) and Gidron (2022). The most recent election is, however, an exception. Figure 9 displaying predicted probabilities from models 3 with interaction between cross-pressure and a West-dummy suggests that this effect was more pronounced among East German CDU voters.

The regression coefficients displayed in Tables 4, 5 and 6 display effects as compared to the reference category which is voting for the SPD. Two characteristics of voters of the German Christian-democracy remain constant over time. First, they attend religious services substantively more often and they are significantly more satisfied with how German democracy works as compared to Social Democratic voters. In 2013 and in 2021 the electorate of the CDU/CSU consisted also of respondents who substantively more satisfied with their personal economic situation as compared to the voters of the SPD. In 2013 and in 2017 a significant negative effect of residence in West Germany is observed which reflected rather the underrepresentation of the SPD in the East than the strength of the CDU in that region. This effect disappeared in 2021. In 2013 the CDU/CSU voters were also substantively older than the SPD voters.

The effects observed with respect to the AfD perfectly correspond with the second proposition formulated in the theory section (P2). As displayed in Figure 4 the AfD attracts significantly more support from the cross-pressured type of voters whose position on migration deviates in the conservative direction from their views on welfare state referred to by Gidron as “welfare chauvinists”. This effect, is however, visible only in 2017 and in 2021, i.e. only after leading supporters of market liberalism and representatives of mainstream conservative elites left the party. This is in turn consistent with conclusions by Arzheimer and Berning (2021). Both in 2017 and in 2021 the effect was statistically significant as demonstrated by the average marginal effects. In 2013, on the other hand, the effect of the cross-pressures index in case of the AfD is negative (Figure 2) suggesting a tilt towards market liberals, but fails to reach the conventional level of statistical significance. After including an interaction between cross-pressures and the West dummy it seems that the effect of attracting welfare chauvinists was in 2021 particularly strong in East Germany (Figure 10).

The examination of regression coefficients for control variables suggests that voters of the AfD are distinguished from the reference category consisting of the SPD voters at all three points in time by their lower satisfaction with democracy. Apart from that the effects observed for the AfD in 2013 and

in two later elections are quite different as if they were recorded for two different parties. In 2013 the electorate of the AfD tended to have higher education level than voters of the SPD, but there was no clear regional pattern. In 2017 and in 2021, on the other hand, the AfD had more East German profile than the SPD, it also attracted younger voters and in 2017 more often middle-aged voters than the SPD. In 2021 one may observe a substantive effect of the gender suggesting that the AfD became more masculine as compared to the reference category.

The third proposition (P3) referred to the second party of the German mainstream right, the FDP. Due to its profile as a representative of classical liberalism combining cultural progressivism with pro-market economy stance, it was expected to garner support from the group of cross-pressured voters referred to as “market cosmopolitans”. This is confirmed by the empirical analysis. As visible in figure 5 in all three elections the FDP was favored by voters whose positions on welfare state was more conservative as compared to their positions on cultural issues. The effect was statistically significant, however, in 2017 this can be confirmed only if we apply the 90%-confidence intervals. Figure 11 confirms that the FDP both in West and in East Germany attracted at that election more support also from less cross-pressured voters than in 2013 and in 2021, even though its particular appeal to market cosmopolitans remained visible.

Besides constantly observed effect of welfare chauvinism the electorate of the FDP seem to differ much between elections. In 2013 the party was elected by voters with higher educational status as compared to the SPD. In 2017 and in 2021 one may observe the positive effect of personal economic situation. In 2021 voters of the FDP were furthermore substantively younger than voters of the Social democrats and less satisfied with democracy. Interestingly, with respect to the latter effect the electorate of the FDP resembled more voters of the AfD and the far-left die Linke than respondents who reported voting for other mainstream parties.

The fourth proposition assumed that three German left-of-the-center parties are supported by consistent progressives, so no effect of cross-pressure should be found. As empirical data (Figure 2) demonstrates this is true without further qualifications with respect to the SPD. In case of the Greens a substantive effect of cross pressure can be found in 2021. The direction of the effect suggest that the party was then substantively more attractive for market cosmopolitans. The result of die Linke for the 2017 data is probably most puzzling, since the direction of the cross-pressure effect similar to the one found among the FDP, but it minimally fails to reach conventional level of statistical significance. This finding should function as a reminder that the cross-pressure effect as operationalized by the welfare chauvinism index used in this study is merely a measure of relative divergence between respondent’s self-positioning on economic and cultural dimension. This is not identical with her classification as a welfare chauvinist or market cosmopolitan in absolute terms.

Conclusion

The analysis demonstrates the relevance of cross-pressures for explaining the vote for different types of parties positioned to the right of political center. It also shows how the effect changed over time.

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Figure 1. Descriptive Statistics: Changing percentage of different voter types (unweighted).




Figure 2. Average marginal effects by year and party model 2 with 95% (black) and 90% (grey) confidence intervals.




Figure 3. Model 2 CDU/CSU




Figure 4. Model 2 AfD




Figure 5. Model 2 FDP




Figure 6. Model 2 SPD




Figure 7. Model 2 Grüne




Figure 8. Model 2 Linke




Figure 9. Model 3 CDU/CSU.




Figure 10. Model 3 AfD.




Figure 11. Model 4 FDP.




Figure 12. Model 3 SPD.




Figure 13. Model 3 Greens.




Figure 14. Model 3 Die Linke.




Table 1. Model 1 2013, base outcome: SPD.

	CDU_CSU	FDP	Greens	Linke	AfD
Female	0.32* (0.15)	-0.06 (0.27)	0.48* (0.21)	0.29 (0.22)	-0.87 (0.53)
Church att.	0.23** (0.05)	0.04 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.09)	-0.45*** (0.11)	-0.38 (0.24)
Pers. econ.	0.34** (0.11)	0.14 (0.20)	-0.01 (0.15)	-0.25 (0.16)	-0.14 (0.32)
Education	0.16 (0.10)	0.55** (0.18)	0.49*** (0.15)	0.40* (0.16)	0.65* (0.32)
Dem. satisfaction	0.38*** (0.10)	0.20 (0.17)	0.19 (0.14)	-0.69*** (0.14)	-0.71** (0.26)
Age (cent.)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Age (cent.) sq.	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Welf. chauv.	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.07)
Constant	-3.33*** (0.50)	-3.93*** (0.89)	-2.22** (0.68)	1.96** (0.66)	-0.62 (1.27)
Observations	1221				
Pseudo R^2	0.118				
ll	-1568.19				

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2. Model 1 2017, base outcome: SPD.

	CDU_CSU	FDP	Greens	Linke	AfD
Female	0.19 (0.14)	-0.28 (0.20)	0.10 (0.20)	0.08 (0.21)	-0.49* (0.24)
Church att.	0.32*** (0.05)	0.15* (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	-0.45*** (0.11)	-0.04 (0.10)
Pers. econ.	0.16 (0.10)	0.29* (0.15)	0.08 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.13)	0.19 (0.15)
Education	0.04 (0.10)	0.29* (0.14)	0.53*** (0.15)	0.59*** (0.15)	-0.06 (0.17)
Dem. satisfaction	0.30** (0.09)	-0.14 (0.13)	0.06 (0.13)	-0.67*** (0.12)	-1.21*** (0.15)
Age (cent.)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Age (cent.) sq.	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Welf. chauv.	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)
Constant	-2.13*** (0.49)	-2.24*** (0.68)	-2.70*** (0.67)	1.25* (0.61)	2.48*** (0.67)
Observations	1450				
Pseudo R ²	0.096				
ll	-2107.44				

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3. Model 1 2021, base outcome: SPD.

	CDU_CSU	FDP	Greens	Linke	AfD
Female	0.09 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.14)	0.35** (0.12)	0.22 (0.17)	-0.70*** (0.19)
Church att.	0.30*** (0.04)	0.10 (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.09)	0.02 (0.08)
Pers. econ.	0.34*** (0.08)	0.33*** (0.10)	0.19* (0.08)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.12 (0.11)
Education	-0.04 (0.08)	0.02 (0.10)	0.74*** (0.10)	0.32* (0.13)	-0.19 (0.13)
Dem. satisfaction	0.16* (0.07)	-0.42*** (0.08)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.72*** (0.10)	-1.71*** (0.11)
Age (cent.)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Age (cent.) sq.	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Welf. chauv.	0.01 (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)
Constant	-2.74*** (0.40)	-0.60 (0.45)	-3.32*** (0.44)	0.54 (0.53)	4.01*** (0.53)
Observations	2654				
Pseudo R ²	0.130				
ll	-3868.06				

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4. Model 2 2013, base outcome: SPD.

	CDU_CSU	FDP	Greens	Linke	AfD
Female	0.29 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.27)	0.48* (0.21)	0.21 (0.23)	-0.83 (0.53)
Church att.	0.30*** (0.06)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.09)	-0.31** (0.12)	-0.43 (0.25)
Pers. econ.	0.34** (0.11)	0.13 (0.20)	-0.00 (0.15)	-0.27 (0.16)	-0.15 (0.32)
Education	0.13 (0.10)	0.55** (0.18)	0.49*** (0.15)	0.33* (0.17)	0.67* (0.31)
Dem. satisfaction	0.39*** (0.10)	0.20 (0.17)	0.19 (0.14)	-0.68*** (0.14)	-0.70** (0.26)
Age (cent.)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Age (cent.) sq.	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Welf. chauv.	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.07)
West	-0.65*** (0.16)	0.37 (0.32)	0.14 (0.23)	-1.07*** (0.25)	0.38 (0.50)
Constant	-3.02*** (0.51)	-4.12*** (0.90)	-2.29*** (0.69)	2.49*** (0.69)	-0.85 (1.30)
Observations	1221				
Pseudo R ²	0.131				
ll	-1545.31				

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5. Model 2 2017, base outcome: SPD.

	CDU_CSU	FDP	Greens	Linke	AfD
Female	0.20 (0.14)	-0.28 (0.20)	0.11 (0.20)	0.10 (0.21)	-0.47 (0.25)
Church att.	0.34*** (0.06)	0.17* (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.36** (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)
Pers. econ.	0.16 (0.10)	0.29* (0.14)	0.08 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.13)	0.20 (0.15)
Education	0.02 (0.10)	0.27 (0.14)	0.54*** (0.15)	0.55*** (0.15)	-0.12 (0.17)
Dem. satisfaction	0.33*** (0.09)	-0.12 (0.13)	0.04 (0.13)	-0.59*** (0.13)	-1.15*** (0.15)
Age (cent.)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Age (cent.) sq.	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Welf. chauv.	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)
West	-0.35* (0.17)	-0.26 (0.24)	0.41 (0.26)	-1.07*** (0.22)	-0.69** (0.26)
Constant	-1.99*** (0.49)	-2.14** (0.68)	-2.91*** (0.68)	1.55* (0.62)	2.73*** (0.68)
Observations	1450				
Pseudo R ²	0.104				
ll	-2088.44				

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6. Model 2 2021, base outcome: SPD.

	CDU_CSU	FDP	Greens	Linke	AfD
Female	0.10 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.14)	0.36** (0.12)	0.16 (0.17)	-0.76*** (0.19)
Church att.	0.30*** (0.04)	0.11 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.09 (0.08)
Pers. econ.	0.34*** (0.08)	0.33*** (0.10)	0.20* (0.08)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.14 (0.12)
Education	-0.03 (0.08)	0.02 (0.10)	0.75*** (0.10)	0.27* (0.13)	-0.24 (0.13)
Dem. satisfaction	0.15* (0.07)	-0.41*** (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.67*** (0.10)	-1.69*** (0.11)
Age (cent.)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Age (cent.) sq.	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Welf. chauv.	0.01 (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
West	0.10 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.15)	0.64*** (0.14)	-0.89*** (0.18)	-0.77*** (0.19)
Constant	-2.78*** (0.41)	-0.57 (0.45)	-3.66*** (0.45)	0.85 (0.54)	4.35*** (0.54)
Observations	2654				
Pseudo R ²	0.140				
ll	-3826.15				

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 7. Model 3 2013, base outcome: SPD.

	CDU_CSU	FDP	Greens	Linke	AfD
Female	0.29 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.27)	0.48* (0.21)	0.21 (0.23)	-0.83 (0.53)
Church att.	0.30*** (0.06)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.09)	-0.31** (0.12)	-0.42 (0.25)
Pers. econ.	0.34** (0.11)	0.15 (0.20)	-0.00 (0.15)	-0.28 (0.16)	-0.14 (0.32)
Education	0.13 (0.10)	0.56** (0.18)	0.49** (0.15)	0.33* (0.17)	0.68* (0.31)
Dem. satisfaction	0.39*** (0.10)	0.18 (0.17)	0.18 (0.14)	-0.68*** (0.14)	-0.68* (0.26)
Age (cent.)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Age (cent.) sq.	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Welf. chauv.	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.25* (0.10)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.15 (0.13)
West	-0.65*** (0.18)	0.32 (0.32)	0.12 (0.24)	-1.06*** (0.27)	0.77 (0.64)
West # Welf. chauv.	0.00 (0.05)	0.16 (0.11)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.21 (0.16)
Constant	-3.01*** (0.52)	-4.01*** (0.91)	-2.26** (0.69)	2.48*** (0.70)	-1.35 (1.37)
Observations	1221				
Pseudo R ²	0.133				
ll	-1543.07				

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8. Model 3 2017, base outcome: SPD.

	CDU_CSU	FDP	Greens	Linke	AfD
Female	0.20 (0.14)	-0.28 (0.20)	0.12 (0.20)	0.11 (0.21)	-0.46 (0.25)
Church att.	0.34*** (0.06)	0.17* (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.36** (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)
Pers. econ.	0.16 (0.10)	0.29* (0.14)	0.08 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.13)	0.19 (0.15)
Education	0.02 (0.10)	0.27 (0.14)	0.54*** (0.15)	0.55*** (0.15)	-0.10 (0.18)
Dem. satisfaction	0.33*** (0.09)	-0.12 (0.13)	0.02 (0.13)	-0.58*** (0.13)	-1.18*** (0.15)
Age (cent.)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Age (cent.) sq.	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Welf. chauv.	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.24** (0.08)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)
West	-0.44* (0.19)	-0.32 (0.25)	0.30 (0.27)	-1.08*** (0.24)	-1.01*** (0.30)
West # Welf. chauv.	0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.07)	0.22* (0.09)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.17* (0.07)
Constant	-1.87*** (0.50)	-2.07** (0.69)	-2.75*** (0.69)	1.50* (0.63)	3.05*** (0.70)
Observations	1450				
Pseudo R ²	0.107				
ll	-2081.57				

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 9. Model 3 2021, base outcome: SPD.

	CDU_CSU	FDP	Greens	Linke	AfD
Female	0.09 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.14)	0.36** (0.12)	0.16 (0.17)	-0.76*** (0.19)
Church att.	0.30*** (0.04)	0.11 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.09 (0.08)
Pers. econ.	0.34*** (0.08)	0.33*** (0.10)	0.20* (0.08)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.14 (0.12)
Education	-0.03 (0.08)	0.02 (0.10)	0.75*** (0.10)	0.27* (0.13)	-0.24 (0.13)
Dem. satisfaction	0.15* (0.07)	-0.41*** (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.67*** (0.10)	-1.69*** (0.11)
Age (cent.)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Age (cent.) sq.	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Welf. chauv.	0.06 (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)
West	0.15 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.15)	0.66*** (0.14)	-0.88*** (0.18)	-0.74*** (0.21)
West # Welf. chauv.	-0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)
Constant	-2.82*** (0.41)	-0.58 (0.45)	-3.68*** (0.45)	0.84 (0.54)	4.33*** (0.55)
Observations	2654				
Pseudo R ²	0.140				
ll	-3824.28				

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$