

**It's not (only) whether you win or lose, it's how you place the blame:
The winner-loser gap in perceptions of electoral integrity in Germany**

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Do electoral losers evaluate the fairness and integrity of elections differently than electoral winners? In representative democracies, regular and competitive elections are the principal mechanism for ensuring citizen influence on government. Elections are the main vehicle for determining who gets to rule, and ultimately for deciding on 'who gets what, when, and how.' Given their competitive nature, democratic electoral contests unavoidably produce winners and losers within the electorate. While previous research shows that electoral losers are less trustful towards politics and less satisfied with how democracy works than electoral winners, only little is known about how being on the winning or losing side of electoral contests impacts on citizens' confidence in the electoral process itself. Any signs of a winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions might indicate that losers' consent – the tacit acknowledgement of the legitimacy of a system that has produced an undesirable outcome – is at stake, with possibly far-reaching implications for the acceptance of election outcomes and participation in future electoral contests. Against this backdrop, this study breaks new ground by investigating whether and how experiences of winning and losing at the ballot box shape voters' views about the fairness and integrity of the electoral process. Relying on newly collected data from the pre- and post-election surveys of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) 2021, the analysis provides evidence for a consistent winner-loser gap in voters' electoral-integrity perceptions, with electoral losers reaching systematically more negative evaluations of the electoral process than electoral winners. In addition, the analysis shows that the winner-loser gap is particularly pronounced for voters who lost in two consecutive federal elections ('repeated losers') as well as for those who suffered electoral defeat with both their list and district votes ('double losers'). These findings provide important insights on how voters in mixed-member proportional systems cope with winning and losing at the ballot box, highlighting that electoral losers place (part of) the blame for their electoral defeat on the electoral process and procedures as such.

Key words: electoral integrity, winner-loser gap, losers' consent, voting behavior, procedural fairness, legitimacy, German federal election 2021

1 Introduction

In representative democracies, regular and competitive elections are the principal mechanism for ensuring citizen influence on government. Elections are the main vehicle for determining who gets to rule, and ultimately for deciding on ‘who gets what, when, and how.’ Given their competitive nature, democratic electoral contests unavoidably produce winners and losers within the electorate. For the long-term functioning and viability of democratic systems, it undoubtedly matters in which ways citizens react to electoral success and defeat, and especially how winning and losing at the ballot box affect citizens’ views about elections and the political system more generally (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, and Listhaug 2005).

Previous research shows a consistent winner-loser gap in citizens’ broader legitimacy beliefs, with electoral winners being more satisfied with the government and the way democracy works, and more trustful of political institutions and the political system than electoral losers (see, *inter alia*, Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Anderson et al. 2005; Criado and Herreros 2007; Moehler 2009; Martini and Quaranta 2019; Rich and Treece 2018; Daoust, Plescia, and Blais 2021; Nadeau, Daoust, and Dassonneville 2021). What is more, extant studies highlight that the winner-loser gap in citizens’ legitimacy beliefs is rather persistent over time (Dahlberg and Linde 2017; Hansen, Klemmensen, and Serritzlew 2019), and that in particular repeated experiences of being on the losing side of elections are detrimental to citizens’ satisfaction with democracy and trust in politics (Anderson et al. 2005; Chang, Chu, and Wu 2014; Kern and Kölln 2022).

At the same time, however, we still lack a thorough understanding of how winning and losing at the ballot box influence citizens’ perceptions of the electoral process itself (Sances and Stewart 2015: 176; Daniller and Mutz 2019: 47). This omission in the scholarly debate is surprising, as “regime support among citizens in the aftermath of an election depends on the widespread belief that the electoral contest has been resolved in a legitimate fashion” (Nadeau and Blais 1993: 553). In particular, this assertion applies to electoral losers whose consent rests on the perception that elections, while having produced an undesirable outcome, have nonetheless been conducted in a procedurally fair manner. As long as citizens differentiate between process and outcome, being on the winning or losing side of elections should not affect their perceptions of electoral integrity (Daniller and Mutz 2019: 47). Yet the taste of victory is sweet, and that of electoral defeat is bitter. Hence, citizens’ evaluations of electoral outcomes may blend into their assessments of the electoral process, inducing them to attribute responsibility for electoral success and defeat on the electoral process and procedures as such. Such a connection between the outcomes of elections and citizens’ electoral-integrity perceptions, in turn, may have far-reaching implications for the acceptance of election results, compliance with laws and regulations, as well as citizens’ participation in future electoral contests (Anderson et al. 2005: 3–4; Schnaudt forthcoming). Empirical tests of these propositions are largely lacking and either refer to the presidential system of the US (Sances and Stewart 2015; Sinclair, Smith, and Tucker 2018; Daniller and Mutz 2019; Kernell and Mullinix 2019; Levy 2021) or rely on single-item or aggregated summary measures of electoral-integrity

perceptions that leave open which distinct aspects of citizens' electoral-integrity beliefs are colored by their status as electoral winners or losers (Cantú and García-Ponce 2015; Flesken and Hartl 2018).

Against this backdrop, this study breaks new ground by investigating whether and how experiences of winning and losing at the ballot box shape voters' views about the fairness and integrity of the electoral process in Germany. Relying on newly collected data from the pre- and post-election surveys of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) 2021, the study contributes to the extant literature in at least three distinct ways: First, it extends the analysis of a winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions to the German case, a mixed-member proportional system in which winning and losing can occur at two levels, namely via the list and district vote. Second, it analyzes the persistence of a winner-loser gap in citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions by considering the impact of repeated winning and losing over two consecutive German federal elections. Third, it investigates different facets of citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions separately, allowing to disentangle which aspects of the electoral process are most strongly affected by a winner-loser gap. The empirical analysis provides evidence for a consistent winner-loser gap in voters' electoral-integrity perceptions, with electoral losers reaching systematically more negative evaluations of the electoral process than electoral winners. In addition, the analysis shows that the winner-loser gap is particularly pronounced for voters who lost in two consecutive federal elections ('repeated losers') as well as for those who suffered electoral defeat with both their list and district vote ('double losers'). These findings provide important insights on how voters in mixed-member proportional systems cope with winning and losing at the ballot box, highlighting that electoral losers place (part of) the blame for their electoral defeat on the electoral process and procedures as such.

In what follows, we first provide a theoretical discussion on the winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions and derive testable hypotheses for the empirical part of the study. We then present the data and methods used in the analysis and discuss the study's findings in light of the hypotheses specified. We conclude with a summary of the most important insights, elaborate on their broader implications, and outline possible avenues for future research.

2 Democratic elections and the winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions

As any other type of competition, democratic elections produce winners and losers. For the longevity of democratic systems, the ways in which citizens react to electoral success and defeat are crucial. For those on the winning side, life is pleasant: not only do they get the cake they want but they also get a bigger piece of it. For electoral losers, in contrast, life is more complicated: they are served a cake they did not ask for and usually have to wait for some more years until they get the chance to place a new order. While electoral winners thus can be expected to be satisfied with the outcome of an election, the same expectation is less obvious for electoral losers who, following electoral defeat, "must, somehow, overcome any bitterness and resentment and be willing, first, to accept the decision of the election and, second, to play again next time" (Anderson et al. 2005: 4). For representative democracies, it is this kind

of losers' consent – the tacit “recognition of the legitimacy of a procedure that has produced an outcome deemed to be undesirable” (Nadeau and Blais 1993: 553) – that is critical to their long-term functioning and survival (Sances and Stewart 2015: 176). Failing to secure losers' consent in the aftermath of an election might compromise the acceptance of election outcomes, negatively affect compliance with the laws and regulations of a newly elected government, and even undermine continued participation in the democratic process at large (Anderson et al. 2005: 3–4; Kern and Kölln 2022: 3; Werner and Marien 2022: 430; Schnaudt forthcoming).

Going beyond these general propositions informed by democratic theory, the empirical value and impact of losers' consent ultimately depend on citizens' ability to keep evaluations of electoral outcomes distinct from evaluations of the electoral process itself (Sances and Stewart 2015: 177; Daniller and Mutz 2019: 47). For citizens to conclude that a fair procedure has brought about an unfavorable outcome presupposes that their perceptions of the electoral system and process are not colored by their experiences with a particular election result. However, as argued and shown by a large body of research, “the experience of winning and losing and becoming part of the majority and minority leads people to adopt a lens through which they view political life” (Anderson et al. 2005: 3) and which forms the basis of a well-documented winner-loser gap in citizens' broader legitimacy beliefs. In a nutshell, previous research has brought to light a number of key insights: (1) electoral winners are more satisfied with the ways government and democracy function, and are more trustful of political institutions and the political system than electoral losers (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Anderson et al. 2005; Criado and Herreros 2007; Moehler 2009; Campbell 2015; Martini and Quaranta 2019; Rich and Treece 2018; Nadeau et al. 2021); (2) the winner-loser gap in legitimacy beliefs is relatively persistent over time (Dahlberg and Linde 2017; Hansen et al. 2019); (3) especially repeated experiences of winning and losing contribute to the size of the winner-loser gap (Anderson et al. 2005; Chang et al. 2014; Kern and Kölln 2022); (4) the nature of the winner-loser gap is more utilitarian than emotional in character, i.e., it is based more strongly on citizens' objective status as electoral winners and losers rather than their subjective feeling of being a winner or loser (Singh, Karakoç, and Blais 2012; Daoust et al. 2021); and (5) the very act of participating in elections boosts legitimacy beliefs among both winners and losers at least in the short run (Nadeau and Blais 1993; Esaiasson 2011; Hooghe and Stiers 2016). Overall, extant research has thus provided strong evidence that being on the winning or losing side of elections comes with far-reaching implications for citizens' broader legitimacy beliefs, highlighting that how citizens judge the outcome of a particular election colors their evaluations concerning the trustworthiness of political institutions as well as the functioning of democracy.

But do evaluations of electoral outcomes affect the way in which citizens view the fairness and integrity of the electoral process itself? Is there a winner-loser gap in citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions? Answering these questions in the affirmative would be normatively troubling, as it would imply that citizens' perceptions of electoral integrity are not only determined by the quality of the

electoral process and procedures as such but also by the specific results of an election. Such a finding, in turn, would indicate that one of the core preconditions for losers' consent is violated, namely that citizens' evaluations regarding the fairness and integrity of the electoral process should ideally be independent from their evaluations of electoral outcomes (Daniller and Mutz 2019: 47). Despite their importance for the viability of representative democracies, these questions have received only scant attention in the scholarly debate, leading to a situation in which "our knowledge of the relationship between electoral outcomes and perceptions of electoral fairness is still limited" (Sances and Stewart 2015: 176). To date, only few studies have provided empirical insights on this relationship. These studies show that, similar to citizens' broader legitimacy beliefs pertaining to democratic satisfaction and political trust, there is a consistent winner-loser gap in how citizens view the integrity of elections, with electoral winners being more confident than losers that elections were clean and not affected by fraud. Specifically, electoral winners are more likely to believe than electoral losers that votes were counted correctly, that election officials behaved fairly, that journalists and the media provided fair coverage of the electoral process, and that illicit voting was not a major concern during the election (Cantú and García-Ponce 2015; Sances and Stewart 2015; Flesken and Hartl 2018; Karp, Nai, and Norris 2018; Kerr 2018; Sinclair et al. 2018; Daniller and Mutz 2019; Kernell and Mullinix 2019; Levy 2021). Moreover, extant research suggests that the effects of winning and losing persist even several months after an election (Anderson et al. 2005: 58–59; Sinclair et al. 2018: 865) and that especially repetitive losses are detrimental to citizens' perceptions about the fairness and integrity of elections (Daniller and Mutz 2019: 61).

While these studies have provided valuable insights into the existence of a winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions, they have left open important questions. First, most of existing studies have focused on single countries, in particular the US, thus leaving unanswered the question if and to what extent their findings may travel to other contexts (cf. Sances and Stewart 2015: 184; Daniller and Mutz 2019: 61; Kernell and Mullinix 2019: 20). Extant research has shown that the winner-loser gap in citizens' broader legitimacy beliefs varies between majoritarian and proportional systems (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and Tverdova 2003), rendering an analysis outside the context of the US an expedient endeavor to extend our knowledge on the existence and nature of a winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions. Second, previous studies have mostly relied on single-item or summary measurements of citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions, leaving aside the question which specific aspects of citizens' electoral-integrity beliefs are shaped by experiences of winning and losing. Yet electoral integrity – and the universal standards it implies – refers to the electoral process as a whole, "including during the pre-electoral period, the campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath" (Norris 2014: 21). Hence, when analyzing electoral-integrity, it is worthwhile to consider citizens' perceptions pertaining to various stages of the electoral cycle and to investigate whether a winner-loser gap is restricted to certain aspects of electoral integrity or rather permeates all stages of the electoral cycle.

In this study, we aim to address these open questions in the scholarly debate by analyzing the existence and nature of a winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions in Germany. Several reasons render the German case well-suited for that purpose: First, Germany's electoral system with mixed-member proportional representation, via its two separate votes for electoral districts and party lists, combines a majoritarian and a proportional element, allowing us to investigate the presence of a winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions in both a majoritarian and proportional setting while holding any other features of the political system or context constant. Second, the available data for the German case enables us to analyze three different aspects of citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions pertaining to different stages of the electoral cycle. Third, the 2021 German Federal elections have brought about a change in government composition as compared to the previous elections in 2017, giving us the unique opportunity to investigate the impact of repeated winning and losing on perceptions of electoral integrity while differentiating between one-time and two-time electoral winners and losers. Fourth and last, German elections have been attested to be among the cleanest worldwide (Norris, Frank, and Martínez i Coma 2014: 794; Norris 2019: 10), making it more plausible that any gaps in electoral-integrity perceptions between electoral winners and losers emanate from evaluations of electoral outcomes rather than (objective) deficiencies in the electoral process as such.

In what follows, we briefly outline the reasons and underlying mechanisms that may bring about a winner-loser gap in citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions. In a second step, we discuss different kinds of winner-loser gaps that may exist in the German mixed-member proportional system and develop testable hypotheses pertaining to their impact on citizens' perceptions about the fairness and integrity of elections.

2.1 Foundations of the winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions

Thinking about the reasons and underlying mechanisms that explain why electoral winners and losers react differently to the outcome of an election, previous research has identified three different perspectives that may shed light on the underpinnings of a winner-loser gap in citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions: (1) a utilitarian perspective, (2) an affective perspective, and (3) a cognitive consistency perspective (Anderson et al. 2005: 22–29). From a utilitarian perspective, the expected utility of being on the winning side of elections should be higher than that of being on the losing side. Assuming that newly elected governments will enact the policies they promised prior to an election, electoral winners have a high chance of seeing their demands fulfilled in the policy outputs of the following years. Electoral losers, by contrast, have to cope with a situation in which the political game will be determined by political parties and politicians they did not opt for, and that are likely to provide political solutions not in line with losers' preferences (Anderson et al. 2005: 3–4; Hooghe 2018: 625; Rich and Treece 2018: 418). Consequently, as a reaction to the reduced benefits the political system is likely to deliver until the next election, electoral losers may start questioning the fairness and integrity of the process that has brought about such an undesirable outcome. For electoral winners, the opposite

holds true. From an affective perspective, the winner-loser gap is based on the specific experiences of winning and losing that may trigger heterogeneous emotional reactions on the side of citizens. While all citizens may experience emotional gratification through “their personal involvement in the decision-making process” (Esaiaasson 2011: 103), the specific emotional repercussions in the aftermath of an election are likely to differ substantially between winners and losers. “In general, winning produces a range of pleasant emotional outcomes and reductions in arousal and stress, while losing produces the reverse” (Anderson et al. 2005: 26). In line with these assertions, previous research has shown that electoral losers become less happy in the aftermath of an election, highlighting that electoral defeat triggers negative emotional reactions or, in other words, that “losing hurts” (Pierce, Rogers, and Snyder 2016). The positive and negative emotional responses emanating from winning and losing in an election are likely to find their way into citizens’ perceptions of the electoral process, with electoral losers likely to judge a procedure that has brought about unpleasant feelings and emotions in a negative way. Lastly, from a cognitive consistency perspective, the winner-loser gap rests on a psychological mechanism aimed at dissonance avoidance. According to this mechanism, individuals exhibit an inherent motivation to maintain consistency in their attitudes and behaviors and thus tend to judge political objects in such a way that it corresponds with their preexisting political predispositions and behaviors. To achieve consistency in their attitudes and behaviors, citizens can be expected to strive for evaluations of and attitudes towards the political system that match their preceding electoral behavior rather than to wait for the next elections to adjust their vote choice (Anderson et al. 2005: 26–29; Zaller 1992: 44). For electoral winners, this sort of consistency adjustment in electoral-integrity perceptions should lead to positive evaluations of the electoral process, whereas electoral losers should be more doubtful about the fairness and integrity of elections.

Following these insights from the utilitarian, affective, and cognitive consistency perspectives, “the winner-loser gap can originate either from losers losing, winners winning, or a combination of both” (Kern and Kölln 2022: 3). While it is not possible to disentangle the precise ebbs and flows of electoral winners and losers’ integrity perceptions in the present study,¹ what matters is that all three perspectives provide a sound rationale for the existence of a winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions. Hence, the following hypothesis is the first to be tested in the present study:

H1: Electoral winners exhibit more positive perceptions of electoral integrity than electoral losers.

While this hypothesis has been tested and confirmed in previous studies (Cantú and García-Ponce 2015; Sances and Stewart 2015; Flesken and Hartl 2018; Karp et al. 2018; Kerr 2018; Sinclair et al. 2018; Daniller and Mutz 2019; Kernell and Mullinix 2019; Levy 2021), these studies have been restricted to the US, Mexico, and pooled samples from cross-national investigations. Hence, an empirical test of this

¹ The same applies to arguments about possible asymmetric effects of winning and losing on electoral-integrity perceptions (but see Daniller and Mutz 2019).

hypothesis in the context of Germany with its mixed-member proportional system is still outstanding and may provide valuable insights on the generalizability of earlier findings across countries and contexts.²

2.2 Different kinds of winner-loser gaps?

The preceding discussion has mainly focused on the question of *whether* to expect a winner-loser gap in citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions. In the following, we direct our attention to the question of *what kinds* of winner-loser gaps might be relevant for citizens' perceptions about the fairness and integrity of elections. We identify two kinds of winner-loser gaps that result in different types of winners and losers: First, considering a temporal dimension, we identify 'repeated' winners and losers who belong to the winning or losing camp in two (or more) consecutive elections. Second, taking into account the specificities of the German mixed-member proportional system in which citizens are allowed to cast two votes in federal elections, we identify 'double' winners and losers who experience electoral success or defeat with both their district and list votes.

2.2.1 'Repeated' winners and losers

In consolidated democracies, elections establish a repeated game in which citizens are given the regular opportunity to express their political will by (s)electing political representatives in a competitive contest. After all, the very concept of representative democracy rests on the idea that voters themselves can decide on who is going to represent their interests, and who are the 'rascals' that need be thrown out at the next election in case citizens feel their interests are no longer attended to. As long as political majorities are not cast in stone and citizens feel there is a realistic chance for alternation in power, the viability of democratic systems is not at stake. If citizens belong to the losing camp in one election but switch to being a winner in the aftermath of the next election, such experiences of alternation in power might in fact strengthen their beliefs in the fairness and integrity of the electoral system rather than weakening them. Yet if losing in electoral contests for some citizens becomes a habit rather than a possibility, the situation is more troubling, as these citizens may feel that, despite actively taking part in the electoral process, their voices are permanently overheard and excluded from governmental representation (Kern and Kölln 2022: 3–4). With regard to citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions, such feelings of permanent exclusion are problematic, given that they might nurture the conviction that "repeatedly losing is no longer about a streak of bad luck in a competition but it signifies something more fundamental, something that corrodes the fundamental beliefs in the political system" (Kern and Kölln 2022: 4), including citizens' confidence in the fairness and integrity of the electoral process itself.

Previous studies have provided convincing evidence that experiences of repeated electoral defeat are particularly detrimental to citizens' general legitimacy beliefs, undermining their democratic

² While a recent study by Schmitt-Beck and Faas (2021) assessed the impact of vote choice on perceptions of electoral integrity in Germany, it did not test for a specific winner-loser gap in citizens' views regarding the fairness of elections.

satisfaction (Anderson et al. 2005: 68) and political trust (Kern and Kölln 2022). Although important for the longevity of democratic systems, empirical evidence concerning the impact of repeated winning and losing on citizens' perceptions of electoral integrity is scant. In their study on the US, Daniller and Mutz (2019: 57–58) confirm that repeated experiences of being on the losing side exacerbate the detrimental effects of (one-time) losing on citizens' confidence in the integrity of elections. Outside the US, and especially for the mixed-member proportional system of Germany, comparable evidence is lacking completely. To address this omission in the scholarly debate, the following second hypothesis will be tested:

H2: The winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions is more pronounced between repeated winners and repeated losers than between repeated winners and one-time losers.

2.2.2 'Double' winners and losers

Previous studies on the winner-loser gap in citizens' legitimacy beliefs have largely neglected that in most democratic systems citizens have the opportunity to participate in several electoral contests or may cast more than one vote in a single election. For example, citizens may take part in local, national, or supranational elections. In the presidential system of the US, citizens have a say in who will become president but also who will be their representative in Congress. In the German mixed-member proportional electoral system, citizens have two votes at their disposal in federal elections with which they can elect their preferred (local) candidate in single-member districts and their preferred party for national party lists. The mere possibility of participating in different electoral contests or casting more than one vote in a single contest creates a situation in which voters may be winners and losers at the same time (Blais and Gélneau 2007: 427; Rich and Treece 2018: 419). By the same token, it is conceivable that some voters will be winners or losers across-the-board, i.e., vote for winning or losing candidates and parties throughout all electoral contests or with all their available votes. Borrowing from our earlier arguments on repeated winners and losers across different elections over time, being part of the losing camp with all available votes may trigger feelings of exclusion among citizens, resulting in the conviction that one is denied representation at all levels of the political process. Taking part in the democratic process but losing across-the-board in many citizens' eyes will establish a 'fundamental disappointment' (Hooghe 2018: 625) that eventually may also make them wonder how fair an electoral process can be that overhears their political voice at several occasions.

In empirical studies, this issue has not received much attention to date (Blais and Gélneau 2007: 427; Stiers, Daoust, and Blais 2018: 22). In their study on the US, Anderson and LoTempio (2002) analyzed the effects of winning and losing in presidential and congressional elections on political trust, highlighting that winning in both electoral contests resulted in the highest levels of trust among citizens. The winner-loser gap in political trust is hence most pronounced between 'double' winners and 'double' losers. In addition, they show that being a 'partial' winner in presidential elections boosts political trust,

while ‘partial’ winners in congressional elections do not differ from double losers. Further findings from Canada suggest that the winner-loser gap in democratic satisfaction rests exclusively on the difference between double winners and double losers (Blais and Gélneau 2007). Partially winning or losing with either the list or district vote does not produce any gaps in Canadian citizens’ satisfaction with democracy, suggesting that losing is considered a normal component of democratic life as long as it is complemented with experiences of winning every now and again. In her study on winning and losing in Westminster systems, Henderson (2008) as well shows that citizens who voted for winning parties and candidates with both their (national) list and (local) district votes exhibited the highest levels of democratic satisfaction. What is more, her study indicates that the winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy reacts more strongly to electoral success and defeat based on the list rather than the district vote. Finally, the study by Rich and Treece (2018) probably is the most informative for the present analysis as it also focuses on the German case. Contrary to the findings by Henderson (2008), the authors conclude that “backing a district candidate who fails to enter the governing coalition has a greater substantive effect on satisfaction with democracy than being a party list loser” (Rich and Treece 2018: 431). Overall, previous research has thus provided two main insights: First, experiences of double winning and losing in electoral contests broaden the winner-loser gap concerning citizens’ trust in politics and satisfaction with democracy. Second, findings are mixed when it comes to determine which votes contribute more to the winner-loser gap, those for single-member districts or national party lists.³

Comparable investigations considering the effects of double winning and losing while analyzing citizens’ perceptions of electoral integrity do not exist. To alleviate this gap in the scholarly literature and shed light on the relevance of double winners and losers in the German mixed-member proportional system, the following third hypothesis will be tested in the present study:

H3: The winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions is more pronounced between double winners and double losers than between double winners and partial (list-only/district-only) losers.

3 Data, operationalization, and methods

3.1 Data

The study’s empirical analysis is based on the post-election survey of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES 2022a), which has been conducted in the direct aftermath of the 2021 German Federal Elections. The GLES post-election survey is a cross-sectional survey using a mixed-mode design consisting of online interviews (CAWI) as well as paper-and-pencil interviews (for a recent assessment of mixed-mode surveys, see Wolf, Christmann, Gummer, Schnaudt, and Verhoeven 2021). The target

³ There are two conflicting arguments with regard to which of the two votes may be more consequential for citizens’ perceptions of electoral integrity in the German mixed-member proportional system. On the one hand, district votes may be more consequential as they reflect a “clear and local link between voter and representative” (Henderson 2008: 7) and give a “local face to the party” (Rich and Treece 2018: 421). On the other hand, the party list vote may be more relevant as it plays “a greater role in the overall distribution of seats in Germany’s Bundestag” (Rich and Treece 2018: 431).

population of the survey comprises German citizens with a minimum age of 16, living in private households in Germany at the time of the survey. The survey is based on a high-quality register sample with oversampling for the East German population and comprises a sample size of 3,424 respondents. For supplementary analyses, the data from the post-election survey will be complemented with data from the GLES pre-election survey (GLES 2022b). The pre-election survey uses the identical design and specifications as the post-election survey, has been fielded within the four weeks prior to the 2021 federal election, and comprises a total of 5,116 additional respondents.

3.2 Operationalization

The main concepts and variables of interest for this study are perceptions of electoral integrity and status as electoral winner or loser. The 2021 pre- and post-election surveys of the GLES contain suitable items to operationalize each of these concepts.

3.2.1 Electoral-integrity beliefs

The study's dependent variable, *electoral integrity beliefs*, will be operationalized via three items measuring citizens' perceptions concerning the proper conduct of elections in Germany (q12a-c). On a five-point scale ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree', citizens are invited to evaluate the following three statements: (1) "Federal elections are conducted correctly and fairly by the relevant authorities." (2) "All parties in the federal election campaign have a fair chance to present their positions to eligible voters." (3) "Voting by absentee ballot is a secure procedure." In line with conceptual discussions pertaining to different stages and periods in the electoral cycle (Norris 2013, 2014; van Ham 2015; Frank and Martínez i Coma 2017), these items refer to different aspects of the electoral process, allowing for a more encompassing measurement of citizens' electoral integrity beliefs than the single-item measurement used in previous studies (Cantú and García-Ponce 2015; Sinclair et al. 2018).

For the empirical analysis, each of the three items will be recoded into a dummy variable reflecting answers that 'strongly agree' or 'agree' with the three statements above.⁴ A separate analysis of the three items allows us to inspect which aspects of electoral integrity are most strongly affected by a winner-loser gap. As an additional measure, the three items are combined into a single scale reflecting citizens' overall electoral-integrity beliefs. The uni-dimensionality of the scale was assessed and validated via exploratory factor analysis (see Schnaudt 2020), yielding a single factor accounting for 69 and 66 percent of the variance in the three original items in the pre- and post-election survey, respectively. This finding corresponds with previous studies indicating that citizens' perceptions pertaining to the integrity of different aspects of the electoral process tend to go hand in hand (Fumarola 2020: 49–50; Norris 2019: 11). For the construction of the final scale, the three original items are recoded to range from 0 to 4 and subsequently combined into an additive scale ranging from 0-12 (Cronbach's

⁴ Additional analyses based on items with the original five-point scale do not lead to any substantively different conclusions than the ones presented here.

alpha = 0.76/0.73 in the pre- and post-election surveys), with higher values indicating more positive perceptions of electoral integrity. For the final analysis, and to allow for a more straightforward comparison with the three separate dummy-coded items, the scale has been dichotomized using a median split, with values from 0-9 being recoded to 0 and values from 10-12 recoded to 1.⁵

Figure 1 presents the distribution of the four dependent variables used in the empirical analysis and highlights that German citizens generally exhibit very positive perceptions with regard to different aspects of the electoral process (note that the distribution for the electoral-integrity index is a mere consequence of the median split used for creating this variable).⁶ Yet the results also indicate that for each facet there is a proportion of about twenty to thirty percent of citizens with less benign perceptions regarding the fairness and integrity of German elections, most notably with respect to fair chances for all parties during the campaign period.

[FIGURE 1 HERE]

3.2.2 Electoral winners and losers

For the operationalization of the main independent variable, *status as electoral winner or loser*, we concur with the dominant approach in the literature following the “conventional wisdom that winning an election basically means voting for a party that is in government” (Singh et al. 2012: 209). Accordingly, we rely on a behavioral definition of electoral winners and losers that is based on citizens’ vote choice in the preceding election (Anderson et al. 2005: 34–35). While the literature has proposed other, and partly more complex, operationalizations including gains and losses of parties’ vote or seat shares (Hooghe and Stiers 2016: 53), these alternatives have not been shown to provide findings that are inconsistent with the behavioral operationalization used here. What is more, alternatives relying on citizens’ subjective feelings of being a winner or loser have been shown to be largely unrelated to citizens’ broader legitimacy beliefs: “there is no evidence that the perception of being a winner, as such, contributes to greater satisfaction” (Daoust et al. 2021: 7; see also Singh et al. 2012: 209).

The GLES pre- and post-election surveys include different questions asking respondents about the party (of the candidate) they voted for with both their list and district votes. For the 2021 German federal election, electoral winners are defined as those respondents indicating they voted for the SPD, the Greens, or the FDP. Electoral losers are all those voters who have voted for any remaining party not being part of the new ‘traffic-light coalition’. Hence, this coding procedure also implies that citizens who voted for a successful district candidate that does not belong to any of the three government parties will be coded as electoral losers (see also Rich and Treece 2018: 424). For determining citizens’ status as electoral winners or losers in the preceding German federal election of 2017, the 2021 GLES pre- and

⁵ Additional analyses based on the scale ranging from 0-12 do not lead to any substantively different conclusions than the ones presented here.

⁶ Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the empirical distribution of the original variables for both the pre- and post-election survey of the GLES.

post-election surveys contain additional recall questions on respondents' past voting behavior for both their list and district votes. For the 2017 election, electoral winners are defined by voting for the CDU/CSU or the SPD which back then formed a grand coalition. Respondents indicating to have voted for any of the remaining parties will be classified as electoral losers.⁷ Lastly, respondents who answered to have abstained from either election are excluded from the analysis. In sum, the above coding procedure results in four dummy-coded variables reflecting citizens' status as electoral winners (value 1) or losers (value 0) across two elections (2017 and 2021) and two types of votes (list and district).

For the empirical tests of H2 and H3, these four dummy-coded variables will be combined into two different typologies. To assess the effects of repeated winning and losing, a first typology combines information on winning and losing in 2017 and 2021, yielding four types: repeated winners, one-time winners (2017), one-time winners (2021), and repeated losers. This typology will be created twice based on both citizens' list and district vote. For analyzing the effects of double winning and losing, a second typology combines information on winning and losing for the list and district votes, yielding again four types: double winners, partial winners (list), partial winners (district), and double losers. This typology will be created separately for 2017 and 2021.

3.2.3 Controls

To assess the robustness and relative importance of status as electoral winner and loser in predicting citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions, as well as to control for any spurious effects, the empirical analysis includes several control variables. To keep the results of our empirical analysis largely comparable to existing findings, the selection of controls is informed by previous studies (Flesken and Hartl 2018; Sinclair et al. 2018). On the hand, we control for socioeconomic background variables, including age, gender, education, employment status, and evaluations of one's personal economic situation. On the other hand, we control for a set of attitudinal factors including political interest, political knowledge, internal efficacy, left-right placement, party identification (dummy), and news consumption.

3.3 Methods

Given its primary interest in the existence and nature of a winner-loser gap in citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions, this study follows a factor-centric design (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007) that exclusively focuses on how experiences of winning and losing in elections affect citizens' views concerning the fairness of the electoral process. Overall, the empirical analysis considers a total of four dependent variables, capturing citizens' perceptions related to various aspects of the electoral cycle. All of these dependent variables are binary in nature, rendering binary logistic regression the optimal choice

⁷ For a discussion of possible problems associated with the use of vote recall questions, see Anderson et al. (2005: 35).

for conducting the empirical analysis. In the multivariate statistical models, all continuous independent variables are normalized to range between 0 and 1.

4 Analysis

In what follows, the presentation of results is restricted to the test of the three hypotheses developed earlier but detailed results for the full statistical models including coefficients for all model covariates are available in the Appendix.

4.1 The winner-loser gap in German voters' electoral-integrity perceptions

We start our empirical investigation by considering the impact of winning and losing on how citizens perceive the fairness and integrity of the electoral process (H1). Figure 2 displays the winner-loser gaps observed with regard to four different measures of citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions. In general, the resulting pattern is rather consistent and suggests that electoral winners exhibit more positive perceptions of electoral integrity than electoral losers. As can be seen, electoral winners have a five to fifteen percent higher probability to consider German elections as free and fair, to believe that parties and candidates had a fair chance to present their positions, and to think that voting by postal ballot is secure. These differences between electoral winners and losers are consequently also evident in the citizens' overall assessment as reflected in the findings for the electoral-integrity index. Overall, the most pronounced winner-loser gap pertains to citizens' evaluations concerning political parties' chances to present their positions to voters. Apparently, the strongest reaction to electoral defeat consists in questioning the fairness of the electoral campaign rather than the procedures for casting a vote or the integrity of elections as a whole.

[FIGURE 2 HERE]

Considering the empirical evidence in more detail, the results show that the winner-loser gap is not tied to a specific kind of vote but rather holds for both citizens' list (white dots) and district votes (black dots). What is more, the winner-loser gap does not only exist for electoral winners and losers of the 2021 federal election, but also persists for winners and losers determined in the aftermath of the 2017 election. Only when examining the robustness of the four different winner-loser gaps in a simultaneous assessment (grey squares), it is evident that some of them suffer a loss in their magnitude. More specifically, while the winner-loser gaps in electoral-integrity perceptions based on the list vote in 2017 and the district vote in 2021 almost completely disappear, the winner-loser gaps based on the list vote in 2021 and the district vote in 2017 are more robust, with the latter exerting the most consistent effects across the different facets of electoral integrity and being the most durable over time. Overall, the first stage of our empirical analysis has provided three main insights: (1) there is a consistent winner-loser gap in German voters' perceptions of electoral integrity; (2) this winner-loser gap may emanate

from experiences of winning and losing via both the list and district vote; and (3) is persistent over two consecutive federal elections which were characterized by a partial alternation in the government coalition. In summary, these insights lend support to H1.

4.2 Repeated winning and losing and perceptions of electoral integrity

While there is evidence for a general winner-loser gap in perceptions of electoral integrity, an open question concerns the impact of repeated experiences of winning and losing (H2). Representative democracy builds on the premise that both winning and losing are an integral part of the democratic game, so that winning in one election and losing in another should not induce citizens to question the integrity of the electoral process as such. Yet especially repeated experiences of losing may come with a different gravity for citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions, inducing stronger feelings of political exclusion among repeated as compared to one-time losers.

Figure 3 provides information on these questions by comparing the winner-loser gap for repeated and one-time losers. Again, the emerging picture is very consistent for winner-loser gaps based on either the list (white dots) or the district vote (black dots). Overall, there is one central finding emanating from the analysis: While one time-losers from either the 2017 or the 2021 German federal election do generally not differ in their electoral-integrity perceptions from repeated winners, there is a consistent gap between repeated winners and repeated losers. Specifically, repeated winners exhibit a fifteen to thirty percent higher probability to consider elections as free and fair, to believe that political parties had a fair chance to present their positions during the campaign, and to evaluate postal ballots as secure. What is more, in a simultaneous assessment of winner-loser gaps based on the list and district vote (grey squares), it comes to light that in particular repeated losing with the district vote seems to negatively affect perceptions of electoral integrity. Repeated losing via the list vote still matters with regard to evaluations of political parties' chances to present their positions during the campaign but loses its statistical significance for the remaining aspects of electoral integrity. In sum, the findings presented in Figure 3 thus provide support for H2.

[FIGURE 3 HERE]

4.3 Double winning and losing and perceptions of electoral integrity

Next two repeated winning and losing over time, we consider the impact of double winning and losing in a single electoral contest (H3). In the German mixed-member proportional system, citizens may win or lose with both their list and district vote, or they may enter the winning side with one vote while belonging to the losing camp with the other. Figure 4 presents the findings outlining how winner-loser gaps based on these kinds of double and partial winning and losing relate to citizens' perceptions of electoral integrity.

[FIGURE 4 HERE]

At first glance, it is evident that the overall pattern very much resembles the one observed for repeated winning and losing in the preceding step of the analysis. For both federal elections in 2017 (white dots) and 2021 (black dots), double losers, i.e., those who voted for (candidates of) parties that did not enter the government coalition with both their list and district votes, exhibit systematically more negative evaluations of electoral integrity than double winners. This observation holds across all facets of electoral integrity considered, with double winners being about five to fifteen percent more likely to evaluate the conduct of elections in Germany positively than double losers. In addition, the findings provide no evidence for a gap in electoral-integrity perceptions between double winners and partial losers. This observation suggests that winning via one's list vote might compensate for electoral defeat via one's district vote (and vice versa), thus alleviating any negative perceptions concerning the integrity of the electoral process that might result from partial losing. In other words, the effects of partial winning and losing appear to cancel each other out when it comes to how citizens perceive the fairness of elections. These findings do not change when simultaneously assessing the impact of double winning and losing for the 2017 and 2021 elections in a single model (grey squares). Overall, the results shown in Figure 4 thus lend support to H3.

4.4 Complementary analyses

In a final step of our empirical investigation, we present some complementary analyses that may help to further contextualize the findings presented thus far. First, we consider arguments about the legitimizing function of elections, stating that participation in elections comes with a boost in legitimacy beliefs for both winners and losers (Nadeau and Blais 1993; Hooghe and Stiers 2016). To assess such claims in the German context, we compare perceptions of electoral integrity of winners and losers in the 2021 federal election with those of respondents from the pre-election survey of the GLES. Here, the findings of an additional analysis suggest that both electoral winners and respondents from the pre-election survey exhibit more positive perceptions of electoral integrity than electoral losers (Figure A2 in the Appendix). While these findings are suggestive at best, they indicate that for electoral losers the legitimizing function of participating in elections is rather restricted.

Second, given the pronounced differences in electoral-integrity perceptions between repeated winners and losers, it is worthwhile to explore the foundations of these winner-loser gaps in more detail. To that end, we investigate to what extent the winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions is based on specific groups of voters that, for both objective and subjective reasons, may have the feeling of being permanently excluded from gaining governmental representation. In the German context, these are first and foremost voters of the right-wing populist AfD as well as voters of small parties that usually do not pass the five-percent threshold. When including additional variables identifying voters of the AfD and small parties in our statistical models, it is evident that some of the

gaps between repeated winners and repeated losers do no longer reach statistical significance. This is the case for perceptions of whether ‘elections have been free and fair’ for both the list and district vote as well as for perceptions of whether ‘postal ballots are secure’ for the list vote (see Models 2 and 6 in Tables A2a and A2b in the Appendix). These findings indicate that the gap in electoral- integrity perceptions between repeated winners and losers is at least partially driven by voters opting for parties that do not seem to have a prospect of government participation in the medium to long run. The only facet of electoral integrity that is exempt from this observation pertains to perceptions about political parties’ chances to present their positions to eligible voters during the campaign period, the very same facet that also exhibited the strongest winner-loser gap in our main analysis.

5 Conclusion

“A lack of faith in elections is a lack of faith in the most fundamental of democratic principles” (Daniller and Mutz 2019: 46). Proceeding from this general statement highlighting the importance of citizens’ electoral-integrity perceptions for the viability of modern democratic systems, this study has investigated whether and how experiences of winning and losing at the ballot box shape voters’ views about the fairness and integrity of the electoral process in Germany. Relying on newly collected data from the pre- and post-election surveys of the German Longitudinal Election Study 2021 (GLES 2022a, 2022b), the analysis provides evidence for a consistent winner-loser gap in voters’ electoral-integrity perceptions, with electoral losers reaching systematically more negative evaluations of the electoral process than electoral winners. In addition, the analysis shows that the winner-loser gap is particularly pronounced for voters who lost in two consecutive federal elections (‘repeated losers’) as well as for those who suffered electoral defeat with both their list and district votes (‘double losers’). While winning and losing establish an integral part of the democratic game, our findings suggest that electoral losers place (part of) the blame for their electoral defeat on the electoral process and procedures as such.

These findings provide important insights on how voters in mixed-member proportional systems cope with winning and losing at the ballot box. Specifically, the present study contributes to the extant literature in at least three distinct ways: First, the study clarifies which specific facets of citizens’ electoral integrity perceptions are affected by a winner-loser gap. The study shows that, while a winner-loser gap is generally evident in perceptions pertaining to several stages of the electoral cycle, the strongest reaction to electoral defeat consists in questioning the fairness of the electoral campaign rather than the procedures for casting a vote or the integrity of elections as a whole. Second, the study extends the findings of earlier works focusing on citizens’ broader legitimacy beliefs by showing that also with regard to electoral-integrity perceptions repeated experiences of winning and losing are of particular relevance in determining the magnitude and gravity of a winner-loser gap. Third, the study sheds new light on how in the German mixed-member proportional system citizens’ list and district votes interact in bringing about a winner-loser gap in perceptions of electoral integrity.

Our findings on the existence and nature of a winner-loser gap in German citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions come with far-reaching implications concerning the functioning and viability of modern democracies. For the longevity of representative democracy, losers' consent – the tacit “recognition of the legitimacy of a procedure that has produced an outcome deemed to be undesirable” (Nadeau and Blais 1993: 553) – is crucial. Yet the present study highlights that citizens' evaluations of the electoral process are not independent from the specific outcomes of elections. Quite the contrary, citizens seem to judge the fairness and integrity of elections depending on whether they are part of the winning or losing camp in the aftermath of an election. Hence, perceptions of electoral integrity are not solely derived from the quality of the electoral process as such but are colored by citizens' status as electoral winners and losers. Evidently, considering a procedure as fair depending on whether one judges an outcome produced by that procedure as pleasant renders the distinction between process and outcome obsolete. More importantly, the amalgamation of process and outcome evaluations with regard to citizens' electoral-integrity perceptions raises the question how in modern democracies losers' consent can be secured in the long run. A first answer is that alternation in power will do the trick. Competitive elections will produce varying winners and losers “as the parties wax and wane in terms of who wins” (Sinclair et al. 2018: 865). And there is some truth to that story: As shown in our analysis, occasional experiences of winning and losing do not induce citizens to question the fairness and integrity of the electoral process as such. Quite the contrary, one-time losers tend to evaluate the fairness of elections quite similar to voters who have been part of the winning camp over two consecutive elections. The same observation holds true for partial losers who have lost with their list vote but won with their district vote (and vice versa). Accordingly, winning and losing every once in a while might not be too much of a bad thing for citizens' perceptions of electoral integrity, as experiences of losing can be compensated by corresponding experiences of winning in a different electoral contest. While this finding is good news for the functioning of democratic systems, the observation that repeated and double losers evaluate the fairness of several aspects of the electoral process systematically more negative than repeated and double winners may be more troublesome. For repeated and double losers who are (more or less) permanently excluded from winning in elections and thus from gaining governmental representation, it remains unclear in which ways and by what means increasing doubts about electoral integrity can be alleviated or compensated for. In the German case, permanently excluded groups are primarily voters of the right-wing populist AfD as well as small parties. As part of its electoral campaign at both the federal and state level, the AfD has increasingly relied on rhetoric that calls into question and discredits the fairness and integrity of German elections (Schmitt-Beck and Faas 2021: 145), using burgeoning doubts about electoral integrity among certain segments of the electorate as a platform to mobilize electoral support (Schnaudt forthcoming). For that reason alone, future studies should delve more deeply into how modern democracies can secure not only losers' consent but in particular repeated and double losers' consent.

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


Figure 1. The distribution of electoral integrity perceptions in Germany
Notes: GLES post-election survey (ZA7701), data weighted.




Figure 2. The winner-loser gap in electoral integrity perceptions
Notes: Binary logistic regression. Average marginal effects (change in predicted probabilities) with 95% CI. Results are based on models 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Tables A1a-c (see Appendix). GLES post-election survey (ZA7701), N=1,576.




Figure 3. The impact of repeated winning and losing on electoral integrity perceptions

Notes: Binary logistic regression. Average marginal effects (change in predicted probabilities) with 95% CI. Results are based on models 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Tables 2a-c (see Appendix). GLES post-election survey (ZA7701), N=1,576.




Figure 4. The impact of double winning and losing on electoral integrity perceptions

Notes: Binary logistic regression. Average marginal effects (change in predicted probabilities) with 95% CI. Results are based on models 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Tables A3a-c (see Appendix). GLES post-election survey (ZA7701), N=1,576.

APPENDIX




Figure A1. The distribution of electoral-integrity perceptions before and after the 2021 federal election
Notes: GLES pre- and post-election surveys (ZA7700/ZA7701), data weighted.




Figure A2. The winner-loser gap in electoral integrity perceptions
Notes: Binary logistic regression. Average marginal effects (change in predicted probabilities) with 95% CI. GLES pre- and post-election surveys (ZA7700/ZA7701), N=4,179.

Table A1a. The winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions (list vote)

	Elections free and fair		Fair chance to present positions		Postal ballots secure		Electoral-integrity index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Winner 2017	0.378*	-0.010	0.568***	0.145	0.501**	-0.138	0.494***	0.189
	(0.155)	(0.173)	(0.135)	(0.148)	(0.181)	(0.212)	(0.116)	(0.126)
Winner 2021	0.654***	0.272	0.702***	0.386*	0.571***	-0.128	0.391***	0.099
	(0.145)	(0.176)	(0.133)	(0.153)	(0.165)	(0.216)	(0.116)	(0.131)
Age	0.057	0.246	0.824*	0.942*	0.627	0.875+	0.246	0.349
	(0.447)	(0.472)	(0.377)	(0.394)	(0.467)	(0.506)	(0.333)	(0.344)
Sex: male	0.476**	0.591***	0.130	0.185	-0.175	-0.081	0.113	0.166
	(0.155)	(0.163)	(0.134)	(0.138)	(0.181)	(0.191)	(0.118)	(0.119)
A-level	0.161	0.005	0.235+	0.096	0.321+	0.113	0.241+	0.133
	(0.163)	(0.171)	(0.142)	(0.148)	(0.181)	(0.195)	(0.124)	(0.127)
Unemployed	-0.363	-0.505	0.284	0.223	1.417	1.414	0.357	0.292
	(0.631)	(0.651)	(0.597)	(0.557)	(1.123)	(1.098)	(0.539)	(0.585)
Economic well-being	1.161***	0.970**	0.946**	0.818*	1.788***	1.637***	1.753***	1.653***
	(0.349)	(0.358)	(0.324)	(0.330)	(0.395)	(0.413)	(0.293)	(0.302)
Pol. interest	-0.480	-0.290	-1.384***	-1.300***	-0.888+	-0.737	-0.040	0.117
	(0.398)	(0.399)	(0.352)	(0.364)	(0.474)	(0.498)	(0.297)	(0.308)
Pol. knowledge	0.107	0.129	0.181	0.176	0.072	0.100	0.079	0.075
	(0.153)	(0.158)	(0.134)	(0.137)	(0.168)	(0.177)	(0.118)	(0.121)
Int. efficacy	0.237	0.331	-0.211	-0.174	0.257	0.355	0.118	0.174
	(0.379)	(0.396)	(0.325)	(0.336)	(0.423)	(0.446)	(0.279)	(0.284)
L-R placement	-0.780*	0.118	-0.290	0.497	-1.970***	-0.931+	-0.163	0.457
	(0.392)	(0.439)	(0.358)	(0.392)	(0.439)	(0.488)	(0.309)	(0.327)
Party ID	0.243	0.251	0.210	0.138	0.354	0.256	0.235	0.177
	(0.203)	(0.222)	(0.188)	(0.198)	(0.218)	(0.239)	(0.164)	(0.169)
Newspaper: nat.	-0.300	-0.741	0.706	0.367	0.706	0.159	0.620	0.335
	(0.639)	(0.650)	(0.568)	(0.576)	(0.750)	(0.777)	(0.474)	(0.483)
Newspaper: local	0.723*	0.594+	0.232	0.116	0.065	-0.123	0.078	-0.026
	(0.307)	(0.313)	(0.260)	(0.262)	(0.364)	(0.373)	(0.222)	(0.224)
Newspaper: BILD	0.181	0.331	-0.306	-0.162	-0.451	-0.287	-0.596*	-0.491
	(0.367)	(0.424)	(0.301)	(0.329)	(0.363)	(0.404)	(0.283)	(0.299)
TV: public	0.691**	0.431+	0.757***	0.587**	1.186***	0.927**	0.671***	0.494*
	(0.251)	(0.258)	(0.211)	(0.218)	(0.277)	(0.286)	(0.191)	(0.197)
TV: private	-0.391+	-0.185	-0.101	0.019	-1.000***	-0.870**	-0.603***	-0.501**
	(0.227)	(0.243)	(0.214)	(0.225)	(0.274)	(0.295)	(0.182)	(0.186)
Internet	-0.270	-0.248	0.201	0.272	0.208	0.304	0.163	0.210
	(0.207)	(0.218)	(0.187)	(0.193)	(0.235)	(0.263)	(0.161)	(0.166)
AfD voter 2017		-0.506		-1.304***		-1.100**		-1.160***
		(0.354)		(0.299)		(0.355)		(0.309)
AfD voter 2021		-1.780***		-0.870**		-1.677***		-1.357***
		(0.340)		(0.308)		(0.349)		(0.338)
Other voter 2017		0.039		-0.615+		0.529		-0.057
		(0.470)		(0.363)		(0.596)		(0.390)
Other voter 2021		-0.210		-0.420		-1.211***		-0.496+
		(0.354)		(0.301)		(0.367)		(0.292)
pseudo R^2	0.075	0.119	0.091	0.123	0.139	0.199	0.080	0.110
AIC	1316.681	1264.130	1614.721	1566.941	1073.674	1009.090	1966.689	1912.204
BIC	1418.572	1387.471	1716.611	1690.282	1175.564	1132.431	2068.579	2035.545
N	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576

Binary logistic regression. Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A1b. The winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions (district vote)

	Elections free and fair		Fair chance to present positions		Postal ballots secure		Electoral-integrity index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Winner 2017	0.568*** (0.158)	0.148 (0.172)	0.785*** (0.133)	0.399** (0.143)	0.798*** (0.179)	0.268 (0.201)	0.680*** (0.118)	0.396** (0.127)
Winner 2021	0.598*** (0.148)	0.300+ (0.165)	0.659*** (0.134)	0.402** (0.144)	0.715*** (0.170)	0.279 (0.194)	0.436*** (0.117)	0.231+ (0.124)
Age	0.071 (0.443)	0.254 (0.471)	0.871* (0.374)	0.963* (0.395)	0.708 (0.466)	0.937+ (0.500)	0.290 (0.331)	0.389 (0.344)
Sex: male	0.450** (0.155)	0.591*** (0.163)	0.089 (0.135)	0.169 (0.139)	-0.165 (0.181)	-0.049 (0.191)	0.083 (0.118)	0.153 (0.119)
A-level	0.177 (0.162)	0.018 (0.170)	0.259+ (0.141)	0.121 (0.147)	0.326+ (0.181)	0.141 (0.192)	0.263* (0.124)	0.156 (0.127)
Unemployed	-0.312 (0.596)	-0.488 (0.643)	0.328 (0.568)	0.241 (0.550)	1.446 (1.082)	1.425 (1.105)	0.399 (0.527)	0.308 (0.582)
Economic well-being	1.164*** (0.349)	0.950** (0.356)	0.941** (0.326)	0.785* (0.332)	1.739*** (0.392)	1.536*** (0.409)	1.718*** (0.294)	1.602*** (0.301)
Pol. interest	-0.369 (0.405)	-0.233 (0.403)	-1.260*** (0.358)	-1.217*** (0.369)	-0.718 (0.481)	-0.644 (0.501)	0.065 (0.300)	0.186 (0.310)
Pol. knowledge	0.122 (0.151)	0.130 (0.157)	0.191 (0.133)	0.176 (0.137)	0.096 (0.167)	0.099 (0.176)	0.085 (0.118)	0.076 (0.121)
Int. efficacy	0.285 (0.381)	0.364 (0.396)	-0.169 (0.325)	-0.132 (0.334)	0.311 (0.424)	0.405 (0.443)	0.144 (0.280)	0.194 (0.284)
L-R placement	-0.907* (0.400)	0.048 (0.445)	-0.432 (0.364)	0.354 (0.399)	-2.094*** (0.445)	-1.058* (0.492)	-0.258 (0.312)	0.358 (0.331)
Party ID	0.261 (0.198)	0.252 (0.219)	0.225 (0.187)	0.135 (0.196)	0.383+ (0.215)	0.280 (0.237)	0.257 (0.164)	0.193 (0.168)
Newspaper: nat.	-0.387 (0.637)	-0.772 (0.644)	0.602 (0.570)	0.325 (0.572)	0.611 (0.742)	0.186 (0.767)	0.583 (0.478)	0.341 (0.484)
Newspaper: local	0.708* (0.310)	0.583+ (0.312)	0.203 (0.263)	0.088 (0.262)	0.009 (0.364)	-0.169 (0.369)	0.046 (0.223)	-0.054 (0.224)
Newspaper: BILD	0.124 (0.363)	0.295 (0.421)	-0.365 (0.298)	-0.188 (0.323)	-0.495 (0.373)	-0.307 (0.397)	-0.649* (0.283)	-0.512+ (0.299)
TV: public	0.671** (0.254)	0.414 (0.261)	0.735*** (0.207)	0.557* (0.216)	1.131*** (0.277)	0.869** (0.286)	0.634*** (0.191)	0.458* (0.198)
TV: private	-0.405+ (0.224)	-0.206 (0.241)	-0.098 (0.214)	0.002 (0.223)	-1.019*** (0.267)	-0.889** (0.290)	-0.587** (0.182)	-0.499** (0.186)
Internet	-0.256 (0.209)	-0.255 (0.220)	0.216 (0.190)	0.270 (0.195)	0.226 (0.236)	0.274 (0.260)	0.148 (0.163)	0.193 (0.166)
AfD voter 2017		-0.415 (0.349)		-1.193*** (0.287)		-0.864* (0.338)		-1.077*** (0.301)
AfD voter 2021		-1.795*** (0.337)		-0.875** (0.301)		-1.453*** (0.337)		-1.273*** (0.333)
Other voter 2017		0.108 (0.455)		-0.507 (0.357)		0.678 (0.584)		0.021 (0.379)
Other voter 2021		-0.253 (0.333)		-0.512+ (0.280)		-0.980** (0.332)		-0.468+ (0.279)
pseudo R^2	0.077	0.120	0.096	0.127	0.153	0.202	0.088	0.115
AIC	1314.025	1262.682	1605.501	1559.965	1056.937	1006.311	1950.937	1902.737
BIC	1415.915	1386.022	1707.391	1683.306	1158.827	1129.652	2052.827	2026.078
N	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576

Binary logistic regression. Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A1c. The winner-loser gap in electoral-integrity perceptions (list and district vote)

	Elections free and fair		Fair chance to present positions		Postal ballots secure		Electoral-integrity index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Winner 2017 (list)	0.049 (0.220)	-0.134 (0.231)	0.155 (0.173)	-0.113 (0.181)	-0.039 (0.246)	-0.430 (0.269)	0.144 (0.150)	-0.036 (0.157)
Winner 2017 (district)	0.526* (0.225)	0.226 (0.229)	0.677*** (0.171)	0.468** (0.174)	0.819*** (0.244)	0.498* (0.250)	0.585*** (0.152)	0.415** (0.157)
Winner 2021 (list)	0.480* (0.202)	0.140 (0.229)	0.501** (0.175)	0.238 (0.192)	0.206 (0.212)	-0.425 (0.261)	0.196 (0.154)	-0.057 (0.165)
Winner 2021 (district)	0.279 (0.207)	0.220 (0.214)	0.330+ (0.176)	0.267 (0.180)	0.579** (0.216)	0.501* (0.233)	0.305* (0.155)	0.264+ (0.156)
Age	0.106 (0.445)	0.270 (0.470)	0.902* (0.377)	0.984* (0.394)	0.718 (0.465)	0.922+ (0.502)	0.300 (0.333)	0.384 (0.344)
Sex: male	0.474** (0.156)	0.588*** (0.164)	0.119 (0.136)	0.170 (0.139)	-0.161 (0.182)	-0.075 (0.193)	0.098 (0.119)	0.150 (0.120)
A-level	0.166 (0.162)	0.013 (0.170)	0.249+ (0.142)	0.115 (0.148)	0.319+ (0.181)	0.123 (0.194)	0.261* (0.124)	0.155 (0.127)
Unemployed	-0.334 (0.618)	-0.479 (0.646)	0.310 (0.574)	0.250 (0.550)	1.459 (1.077)	1.492 (1.050)	0.381 (0.535)	0.311 (0.581)
Economic well-being	1.094** (0.350)	0.946** (0.358)	0.853** (0.327)	0.769* (0.332)	1.715*** (0.395)	1.612*** (0.412)	1.683*** (0.294)	1.609*** (0.302)
Pol. interest	-0.391 (0.402)	-0.243 (0.402)	-1.286*** (0.357)	-1.231*** (0.367)	-0.728 (0.478)	-0.623 (0.500)	0.059 (0.300)	0.188 (0.310)
Pol. knowledge	0.119 (0.152)	0.132 (0.157)	0.192 (0.134)	0.180 (0.137)	0.099 (0.168)	0.107 (0.177)	0.083 (0.118)	0.076 (0.121)
Int. efficacy	0.258 (0.383)	0.346 (0.397)	-0.191 (0.329)	-0.159 (0.338)	0.298 (0.427)	0.389 (0.447)	0.147 (0.281)	0.195 (0.285)
L-R placement	-0.854* (0.398)	0.080 (0.446)	-0.393 (0.365)	0.380 (0.400)	-2.057*** (0.446)	-1.013* (0.501)	-0.249 (0.313)	0.363 (0.332)
Party ID	0.270 (0.201)	0.264 (0.221)	0.236 (0.189)	0.155 (0.198)	0.394+ (0.216)	0.287 (0.237)	0.256 (0.164)	0.191 (0.169)
Newspaper: nat.	-0.338 (0.645)	-0.767 (0.649)	0.678 (0.572)	0.351 (0.573)	0.621 (0.748)	0.088 (0.764)	0.607 (0.479)	0.329 (0.484)
Newspaper: local	0.685* (0.309)	0.581+ (0.312)	0.170 (0.262)	0.080 (0.262)	0.004 (0.366)	-0.150 (0.370)	0.033 (0.223)	-0.051 (0.224)
Newspaper: BILD	0.164 (0.367)	0.302 (0.422)	-0.332 (0.300)	-0.181 (0.324)	-0.489 (0.372)	-0.327 (0.394)	-0.632* (0.285)	-0.512+ (0.298)
TV: public	0.628* (0.253)	0.414 (0.260)	0.682** (0.210)	0.553* (0.217)	1.113*** (0.276)	0.907** (0.285)	0.608** (0.192)	0.462* (0.198)
TV: private	-0.392+ (0.226)	-0.192 (0.242)	-0.087 (0.215)	0.018 (0.224)	-1.007*** (0.269)	-0.887** (0.291)	-0.592** (0.182)	-0.497** (0.186)
Internet	-0.269 (0.209)	-0.253 (0.219)	0.199 (0.190)	0.266 (0.195)	0.221 (0.237)	0.301 (0.263)	0.146 (0.162)	0.194 (0.166)
AfD voter 2017		-0.462 (0.356)		-1.232*** (0.298)		-1.026** (0.355)		-1.093*** (0.307)
AfD voter 2021		-1.738*** (0.343)		-0.785* (0.308)		-1.596*** (0.352)		-1.290*** (0.338)
Other voter 2017		0.078 (0.457)		-0.536 (0.359)		0.614 (0.590)		0.016 (0.379)
Other voter 2021		-0.209 (0.349)		-0.425 (0.294)		-1.211*** (0.356)		-0.495+ (0.288)
pseudo R^2	0.081	0.120	0.102	0.128	0.154	0.206	0.089	0.115
AIC	1312.168	1265.905	1600.099	1561.978	1060.088	1004.960	1952.343	1906.562
BIC	1424.784	1399.971	1712.715	1696.044	1172.704	1139.027	2064.958	2040.628
N	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576

Binary logistic regression. Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A2a. Repeated winning and losing and perceptions of electoral integrity (list vote)

	Elections free and fair		Fair chance to present positions		Postal ballots secure		Electoral-integrity index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Winner 2017 & 2021 (ref.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Winner 2017 & loser 2021	-0.459* (0.220)	-0.431+ (0.228)	-0.361+ (0.204)	-0.397+ (0.210)	0.009 (0.257)	0.144 (0.268)	-0.077 (0.165)	-0.062 (0.168)
Loser 2017 & winner 2021	-0.213 (0.204)	-0.111 (0.206)	-0.305+ (0.173)	-0.152 (0.176)	0.019 (0.244)	0.151 (0.241)	-0.260+ (0.146)	-0.165 (0.146)
Loser 2017 & loser 2021	-1.027*** (0.204)	-0.189 (0.275)	-1.269*** (0.177)	-0.527* (0.218)	-1.018*** (0.222)	0.256 (0.332)	-0.960*** (0.162)	-0.310 (0.197)
Age	0.064 (0.447)	0.239 (0.475)	0.845* (0.380)	0.942* (0.394)	0.662 (0.469)	0.876+ (0.506)	0.260 (0.334)	0.351 (0.344)
Sex: male	0.485** (0.156)	0.584*** (0.163)	0.143 (0.135)	0.184 (0.138)	-0.161 (0.182)	-0.081 (0.191)	0.126 (0.118)	0.167 (0.119)
A-level	0.153 (0.163)	0.004 (0.172)	0.224 (0.142)	0.096 (0.148)	0.299 (0.183)	0.114 (0.195)	0.230+ (0.124)	0.134 (0.127)
Unemployed	-0.380 (0.631)	-0.489 (0.649)	0.254 (0.605)	0.224 (0.556)	1.372 (1.119)	1.412 (1.098)	0.336 (0.545)	0.290 (0.585)
Economic well-being	1.134** (0.351)	0.991** (0.361)	0.908** (0.326)	0.819* (0.330)	1.728*** (0.396)	1.636*** (0.415)	1.715*** (0.296)	1.649*** (0.302)
Pol. interest	-0.460 (0.398)	-0.301 (0.397)	-1.361*** (0.355)	-1.300*** (0.364)	-0.854+ (0.479)	-0.736 (0.498)	-0.003 (0.299)	0.121 (0.308)
Pol. knowledge	0.099 (0.153)	0.137 (0.158)	0.166 (0.135)	0.177 (0.138)	0.041 (0.169)	0.099 (0.176)	0.067 (0.118)	0.073 (0.121)
Int. efficacy	0.254 (0.379)	0.318 (0.398)	-0.182 (0.326)	-0.175 (0.337)	0.301 (0.426)	0.356 (0.446)	0.149 (0.278)	0.177 (0.284)
L-R placement	-0.820* (0.392)	0.202 (0.443)	-0.372 (0.364)	0.503 (0.404)	-2.082*** (0.437)	-0.940+ (0.491)	-0.255 (0.312)	0.436 (0.332)
Party ID	0.228 (0.204)	0.259 (0.222)	0.181 (0.191)	0.138 (0.199)	0.319 (0.220)	0.255 (0.239)	0.207 (0.165)	0.175 (0.169)
Newspaper: nat.	-0.284 (0.644)	-0.776 (0.648)	0.739 (0.579)	0.365 (0.579)	0.768 (0.775)	0.163 (0.781)	0.636 (0.479)	0.342 (0.484)
Newspaper: local	0.689* (0.309)	0.618+ (0.318)	0.174 (0.262)	0.118 (0.264)	-0.043 (0.362)	-0.126 (0.374)	0.021 (0.222)	-0.032 (0.225)
Newspaper: BILD	0.200 (0.374)	0.326 (0.420)	-0.285 (0.301)	-0.162 (0.329)	-0.420 (0.368)	-0.287 (0.404)	-0.570* (0.279)	-0.490 (0.298)
TV: public	0.676** (0.251)	0.436+ (0.259)	0.739*** (0.212)	0.587** (0.218)	1.148*** (0.279)	0.926** (0.286)	0.651*** (0.192)	0.494* (0.197)
TV: private	-0.400+ (0.227)	-0.172 (0.244)	-0.117 (0.215)	0.020 (0.225)	-1.031*** (0.278)	-0.871** (0.295)	-0.619*** (0.182)	-0.504** (0.187)
Internet	-0.273 (0.208)	-0.240 (0.218)	0.199 (0.188)	0.272 (0.194)	0.213 (0.238)	0.304 (0.263)	0.158 (0.162)	0.208 (0.166)
AfD voter 2017		-0.597+ (0.362)		-1.308*** (0.308)		-1.090** (0.376)		-1.140*** (0.315)
AfD voter 2021		-1.824*** (0.339)		-0.873** (0.309)		-1.671*** (0.352)		-1.348*** (0.339)
Other voter 2017		0.012 (0.469)		-0.616+ (0.363)		0.534 (0.600)		-0.051 (0.390)
Other voter 2021		-0.267 (0.357)		-0.423 (0.305)		-1.204** (0.371)		-0.481 (0.296)
pseudo R^2	0.076	0.119	0.094	0.123	0.147	0.199	0.084	0.110
AIC	1317.237	1264.971	1611.268	1568.936	1065.965	1011.079	1961.221	1914.091
BIC	1424.490	1393.675	1718.521	1697.639	1173.218	1139.783	2068.474	2042.795
N	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576

Binary logistic regression. Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A2b. Repeated winning and losing and perceptions of electoral integrity (district vote)

	Elections free and fair		Fair chance to present positions		Postal ballots secure		Electoral-integrity index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Winner 2017 & 2021 (ref.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Winner 2017 & loser 2021	-0.251 (0.205)	-0.269 (0.207)	-0.352 ⁺ (0.187)	-0.379 ⁺ (0.192)	0.049 (0.238)	0.094 (0.241)	-0.097 (0.152)	-0.103 (0.155)
Loser 2017 & winner 2021	-0.214 (0.216)	-0.118 (0.217)	-0.488 ^{**} (0.176)	-0.378 ⁺ (0.179)	0.071 (0.261)	0.157 (0.260)	-0.350 ⁺ (0.153)	-0.279 ⁺ (0.153)
Loser 2017 & loser 2021	-1.167 ^{***} (0.212)	-0.461 ⁺ (0.256)	-1.455 ^{***} (0.185)	-0.809 ^{***} (0.211)	-1.418 ^{***} (0.224)	-0.655 ⁺ (0.282)	-1.244 ^{***} (0.173)	-0.721 ^{***} (0.196)
Age	0.101 (0.447)	0.256 (0.472)	0.916 ⁺ (0.378)	0.966 ⁺ (0.395)	0.802 ⁺ (0.477)	0.979 ⁺ (0.504)	0.331 (0.334)	0.406 (0.345)
Sex: male	0.480 ^{**} (0.156)	0.594 ^{***} (0.163)	0.113 (0.136)	0.171 (0.139)	-0.112 (0.182)	-0.018 (0.191)	0.111 (0.119)	0.159 (0.120)
A-level	0.154 (0.163)	0.018 (0.170)	0.244 ⁺ (0.142)	0.121 (0.147)	0.271 (0.185)	0.127 (0.194)	0.245 ⁺ (0.125)	0.156 (0.127)
Unemployed	-0.263 (0.583)	-0.481 (0.641)	0.375 (0.581)	0.246 (0.553)	1.534 (1.040)	1.500 (1.074)	0.471 (0.532)	0.344 (0.583)
Economic well-being	1.132 ^{**} (0.352)	0.948 ^{**} (0.357)	0.913 ^{**} (0.329)	0.784 ⁺ (0.332)	1.707 ^{***} (0.396)	1.540 ^{***} (0.408)	1.691 ^{***} (0.297)	1.597 ^{***} (0.302)
Pol. interest	-0.331 (0.410)	-0.230 (0.404)	-1.238 ^{***} (0.362)	-1.216 ^{***} (0.369)	-0.671 (0.493)	-0.628 (0.506)	0.115 (0.305)	0.202 (0.312)
Pol. knowledge	0.115 (0.153)	0.129 (0.157)	0.188 (0.134)	0.176 (0.137)	0.070 (0.171)	0.082 (0.178)	0.081 (0.119)	0.076 (0.122)
Int. efficacy	0.284 (0.382)	0.363 (0.395)	-0.174 (0.327)	-0.133 (0.334)	0.299 (0.435)	0.389 (0.446)	0.140 (0.281)	0.187 (0.284)
L-R placement	-0.998 ⁺ (0.398)	0.030 (0.445)	-0.534 (0.368)	0.338 (0.409)	-2.268 ^{***} (0.439)	-1.269 ^{**} (0.492)	-0.395 (0.316)	0.258 (0.337)
Party ID	0.235 (0.199)	0.251 (0.219)	0.201 (0.188)	0.134 (0.196)	0.341 (0.218)	0.269 (0.236)	0.220 (0.164)	0.182 (0.168)
Newspaper: nat.	-0.436 (0.645)	-0.775 (0.644)	0.566 (0.577)	0.323 (0.573)	0.549 (0.770)	0.170 (0.774)	0.529 (0.486)	0.333 (0.486)
Newspaper: local	0.691 ⁺ (0.311)	0.583 ⁺ (0.312)	0.186 (0.263)	0.087 (0.262)	-0.040 (0.364)	-0.168 (0.368)	0.025 (0.222)	-0.058 (0.223)
Newspaper: BILD	0.178 (0.376)	0.298 (0.422)	-0.332 (0.300)	-0.186 (0.322)	-0.441 (0.390)	-0.288 (0.404)	-0.601 ⁺ (0.281)	-0.496 ⁺ (0.298)
TV: public	0.651 ⁺ (0.255)	0.414 (0.261)	0.720 ^{***} (0.209)	0.558 ^{**} (0.217)	1.083 ^{***} (0.283)	0.873 ^{**} (0.288)	0.613 ^{**} (0.192)	0.462 ⁺ (0.198)
TV: private	-0.398 ⁺ (0.226)	-0.207 (0.241)	-0.088 (0.215)	0.001 (0.223)	-1.018 ^{***} (0.274)	-0.901 ^{**} (0.291)	-0.576 ^{**} (0.183)	-0.498 ^{**} (0.186)
Internet	-0.242 (0.211)	-0.253 (0.220)	0.233 (0.191)	0.271 (0.195)	0.282 (0.243)	0.308 (0.262)	0.168 (0.164)	0.199 (0.166)
AfD voter 2017		-0.404 (0.356)		-1.186 ^{***} (0.290)		-0.764 ⁺ (0.354)		-1.026 ^{***} (0.303)
AfD voter 2021		-1.782 ^{***} (0.338)		-0.866 ^{**} (0.305)		-1.304 ^{***} (0.350)		-1.211 ^{***} (0.337)
Other voter 2017		0.116 (0.452)		-0.502 (0.357)		0.789 (0.600)		0.061 (0.379)
Other voter 2021		-0.245 (0.336)		-0.506 ⁺ (0.283)		-0.902 ^{**} (0.335)		-0.427 (0.284)
pseudo R^2	0.081	0.120	0.099	0.127	0.170	0.207	0.094	0.116
AIC	1310.266	1264.628	1601.736	1561.928	1038.183	1002.192	1940.922	1902.842
BIC	1417.519	1393.332	1708.988	1690.632	1145.436	1130.896	2048.175	2031.546
N	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576

Binary logistic regression. Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

Table A2c. Repeated winning and losing and perceptions of electoral integrity (list and district vote)

	Elections free and fair		Fair chance to present positions		Postal ballots secure		Electoral-integrity index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Winner 2017 & 2021 <i>list</i> (ref.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Winner 2017 & loser 2021	-0.513 ⁺ (0.309)	-0.390 (0.311)	-0.296 (0.269)	-0.273 (0.274)	-0.034 (0.325)	0.178 (0.340)	-0.056 (0.211)	0.010 (0.216)
Loser 2017 & winner 2021	-0.048 (0.258)	-0.029 (0.255)	-0.000 (0.210)	0.093 (0.211)	0.185 (0.290)	0.243 (0.290)	-0.034 (0.178)	0.015 (0.178)
Loser 2017 & loser 2021	-0.492 (0.299)	0.082 (0.358)	-0.644 ^{**} (0.230)	-0.120 (0.259)	-0.118 (0.324)	0.853 ⁺ (0.412)	-0.356 ⁺ (0.213)	0.093 (0.237)
Winner 2017 & 2021 <i>district</i> (ref.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Winner 2017 & loser 2021	0.075 (0.291)	-0.069 (0.287)	-0.130 (0.246)	-0.218 (0.249)	0.091 (0.300)	-0.039 (0.306)	-0.036 (0.195)	-0.114 (0.198)
Loser 2017 & winner 2021	-0.186 (0.270)	-0.115 (0.267)	-0.468 [*] (0.215)	-0.428 [*] (0.215)	-0.034 (0.300)	-0.004 (0.298)	-0.317 ⁺ (0.186)	-0.289 (0.185)
Loser 2017 & loser 2021	-0.834 ^{**} (0.306)	-0.494 (0.332)	-1.019 ^{***} (0.239)	-0.748 ^{**} (0.249)	-1.334 ^{***} (0.321)	-1.070 ^{**} (0.350)	-1.006 ^{***} (0.224)	-0.769 ^{***} (0.232)
Age	0.134 (0.449)	0.272 (0.474)	0.944 [*] (0.381)	0.989 [*] (0.394)	0.812 ⁺ (0.476)	0.959 ⁺ (0.506)	0.339 (0.336)	0.403 (0.345)
Sex: male	0.502 ^{**} (0.157)	0.589 ^{***} (0.164)	0.142 (0.136)	0.172 (0.139)	-0.110 (0.183)	-0.042 (0.192)	0.124 (0.120)	0.156 (0.120)
A-level	0.141 (0.164)	0.009 (0.171)	0.231 (0.143)	0.115 (0.148)	0.262 (0.185)	0.112 (0.195)	0.242 ⁺ (0.125)	0.155 (0.127)
Unemployed	-0.279 (0.602)	-0.429 (0.637)	0.323 (0.589)	0.262 (0.553)	1.525 (1.038)	1.606 (0.988)	0.433 (0.542)	0.350 (0.583)
Economic well-being	1.073 ^{**} (0.353)	0.968 ^{**} (0.361)	0.817 [*] (0.330)	0.770 [*] (0.332)	1.680 ^{***} (0.398)	1.621 ^{***} (0.413)	1.647 ^{***} (0.298)	1.606 ^{***} (0.303)
Pol. interest	-0.354 (0.406)	-0.246 (0.401)	-1.259 ^{***} (0.361)	-1.229 ^{***} (0.366)	-0.679 (0.491)	-0.610 (0.506)	0.116 (0.305)	0.202 (0.311)
Pol. knowledge	0.113 (0.154)	0.141 (0.158)	0.181 (0.135)	0.181 (0.138)	0.067 (0.172)	0.104 (0.178)	0.075 (0.119)	0.078 (0.122)
Int. efficacy	0.251 (0.386)	0.324 (0.400)	-0.178 (0.331)	-0.164 (0.339)	0.298 (0.439)	0.357 (0.452)	0.155 (0.282)	0.184 (0.286)
L-R placement	-0.940 [*] (0.396)	0.121 (0.447)	-0.508 (0.371)	0.365 (0.414)	-2.241 ^{***} (0.442)	-1.151 ⁺ (0.503)	-0.399 (0.318)	0.273 (0.340)
Party ID	0.247 (0.203)	0.272 (0.220)	0.202 (0.191)	0.154 (0.198)	0.347 (0.219)	0.287 (0.236)	0.214 (0.165)	0.181 (0.168)
Newspaper: nat.	-0.397 (0.653)	-0.820 (0.647)	0.662 (0.583)	0.343 (0.577)	0.574 (0.779)	0.038 (0.769)	0.562 (0.487)	0.319 (0.486)
Newspaper: local	0.676 ⁺ (0.312)	0.616 ⁺ (0.317)	0.128 (0.263)	0.084 (0.264)	-0.065 (0.368)	-0.116 (0.375)	-0.006 (0.222)	-0.052 (0.224)
Newspaper: BILD	0.216 (0.378)	0.307 (0.418)	-0.297 (0.300)	-0.177 (0.324)	-0.434 (0.388)	-0.305 (0.403)	-0.581 [*] (0.281)	-0.496 ⁺ (0.298)
TV: public	0.610 ⁺ (0.255)	0.422 (0.261)	0.663 ^{**} (0.212)	0.554 [*] (0.218)	1.062 ^{***} (0.282)	0.912 ^{**} (0.287)	0.585 ^{**} (0.194)	0.466 ⁺ (0.198)
TV: private	-0.384 ⁺ (0.227)	-0.177 (0.243)	-0.089 (0.217)	0.020 (0.225)	-1.011 ^{***} (0.277)	-0.881 ^{**} (0.292)	-0.589 ^{**} (0.184)	-0.493 ^{**} (0.187)
Internet	-0.250 (0.211)	-0.236 (0.219)	0.212 (0.191)	0.269 (0.195)	0.275 (0.244)	0.335 (0.264)	0.161 (0.164)	0.202 (0.167)
AfD voter 2017		-0.544 (0.366)		-1.232 ^{***} (0.307)		-0.993 ^{**} (0.383)		-1.054 ^{***} (0.315)
AfD voter 2021		-1.738 ^{***} (0.342)		-0.773 [*] (0.313)		-1.474 ^{***} (0.363)		-1.224 ^{***} (0.342)
Other voter 2017		0.071 (0.450)		-0.530 (0.358)		0.691 (0.603)		0.054 (0.379)
Other voter 2021		-0.248 (0.353)		-0.422 (0.299)		-1.157 ^{**} (0.362)		-0.457 (0.296)
pseudo R^2	0.085	0.122	0.105	0.128	0.171	0.211	0.095	0.116
AIC	1310.633	1268.016	1597.441	1565.869	1043.044	1002.854	1943.701	1908.668
BIC	1433.974	1412.808	1720.782	1710.661	1166.385	1147.645	2067.042	2053.460
N	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576

Binary logistic regression. Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

Table A3a. Double winning and losing and perceptions of electoral integrity (2017 only)

	Elections free and fair		Fair chance to present positions		Postal ballots secure		Electoral-integrity index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Winner list & district 2017 (ref.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Winner list & loser district 2017	-0.806* (0.325)	-0.592+ (0.318)	-0.451 (0.297)	-0.240 (0.292)	-0.564 (0.418)	-0.271 (0.409)	-0.544* (0.253)	-0.397 (0.254)
Loser list & winner district 2017	-0.291 (0.250)	-0.111 (0.262)	-0.103 (0.220)	0.226 (0.237)	0.104 (0.321)	0.582 (0.381)	-0.151 (0.183)	0.044 (0.196)
Loser list & district 2017	-0.598*** (0.169)	-0.067 (0.190)	-0.839*** (0.145)	-0.318* (0.161)	-0.774*** (0.190)	-0.061 (0.225)	-0.733*** (0.130)	-0.361* (0.141)
Age	-0.014 (0.446)	0.213 (0.472)	0.773* (0.374)	0.910* (0.394)	0.617 (0.470)	0.910+ (0.503)	0.226 (0.332)	0.356 (0.344)
Sex: male	0.377* (0.154)	0.545*** (0.164)	0.046 (0.133)	0.145 (0.138)	-0.237 (0.179)	-0.086 (0.191)	0.060 (0.118)	0.139 (0.119)
A-level	0.220 (0.162)	0.032 (0.171)	0.280* (0.141)	0.109 (0.148)	0.351+ (0.183)	0.115 (0.195)	0.277* (0.124)	0.153 (0.127)
Unemployed	-0.328 (0.594)	-0.483 (0.644)	0.279 (0.573)	0.227 (0.545)	1.398 (1.104)	1.458 (1.075)	0.379 (0.513)	0.300 (0.580)
Economic well-being	1.316*** (0.352)	1.036** (0.358)	1.050** (0.322)	0.828* (0.327)	1.875*** (0.397)	1.586*** (0.411)	1.780*** (0.292)	1.629*** (0.301)
Pol. interest	-0.493 (0.406)	-0.283 (0.402)	-1.385*** (0.355)	-1.287*** (0.366)	-0.884+ (0.483)	-0.700 (0.500)	-0.015 (0.299)	0.149 (0.309)
Pol. knowledge	0.127 (0.153)	0.129 (0.158)	0.205 (0.134)	0.189 (0.137)	0.110 (0.168)	0.124 (0.176)	0.093 (0.119)	0.081 (0.121)
Int. efficacy	0.269 (0.379)	0.363 (0.394)	-0.223 (0.322)	-0.183 (0.334)	0.228 (0.423)	0.338 (0.449)	0.117 (0.280)	0.173 (0.285)
L-R placement	-1.203** (0.401)	-0.035 (0.446)	-0.741* (0.354)	0.263 (0.395)	-2.387*** (0.445)	-1.049* (0.498)	-0.501 (0.306)	0.279 (0.328)
Party ID	0.244 (0.200)	0.237 (0.221)	0.224 (0.186)	0.138 (0.196)	0.385+ (0.215)	0.307 (0.236)	0.244 (0.165)	0.187 (0.169)
Newspaper: nat.	-0.164 (0.632)	-0.737 (0.645)	0.848 (0.566)	0.409 (0.569)	0.928 (0.746)	0.209 (0.768)	0.733 (0.475)	0.394 (0.483)
Newspaper: local	0.713* (0.309)	0.600+ (0.312)	0.206 (0.260)	0.085 (0.261)	0.031 (0.364)	-0.157 (0.370)	0.049 (0.221)	-0.052 (0.224)
Newspaper: BILD	0.090 (0.365)	0.317 (0.427)	-0.419 (0.302)	-0.201 (0.329)	-0.549 (0.375)	-0.315 (0.405)	-0.672* (0.282)	-0.522+ (0.299)
TV: public	0.709** (0.253)	0.428+ (0.260)	0.738*** (0.208)	0.549* (0.216)	1.138*** (0.276)	0.869** (0.284)	0.643*** (0.191)	0.457* (0.197)
TV: private	-0.444* (0.226)	-0.215 (0.242)	-0.148 (0.213)	-0.002 (0.223)	-1.035*** (0.270)	-0.864** (0.292)	-0.621*** (0.182)	-0.504** (0.186)
Internet	-0.198 (0.210)	-0.211 (0.222)	0.252 (0.189)	0.293 (0.194)	0.262 (0.236)	0.308 (0.260)	0.185 (0.163)	0.211 (0.167)
AfD voter 2017		-0.484 (0.353)		-1.274*** (0.301)		-1.044** (0.354)		-1.116*** (0.308)
AfD voter 2021		-1.925*** (0.328)		-1.013*** (0.301)		-1.531*** (0.331)		-1.356*** (0.330)
Other voter 2017		0.029 (0.472)		-0.521 (0.367)		0.623 (0.580)		0.007 (0.384)
Other voter 2021		-0.362 (0.333)		-0.748** (0.278)		-1.202*** (0.333)		-0.590* (0.274)
pseudo R^2	0.066	0.119	0.083	0.123	0.139	0.203	0.082	0.113
AIC	1330.097	1265.070	1630.777	1568.888	1076.031	1007.044	1965.878	1908.198
BIC	1437.350	1393.774	1738.030	1697.592	1183.284	1135.747	2073.130	2036.902
N	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576

Binary logistic regression. Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3b. Double winning and losing and perceptions of electoral integrity (2021 only)

	Elections free and fair		Fair chance to present positions		Postal ballots secure		Electoral-integrity index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Winner list & district 2021 (ref.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Winner list & loser district 2021	-0.182 (0.273)	-0.229 (0.269)	-0.157 (0.231)	-0.182 (0.229)	-0.186 (0.307)	-0.234 (0.299)	-0.202 (0.194)	-0.227 (0.191)
Loser list & winner district 2021	-0.409 (0.312)	-0.148 (0.337)	-0.337 (0.267)	-0.117 (0.294)	0.344 (0.425)	0.950 ⁺ (0.540)	-0.099 (0.237)	0.107 (0.254)
Loser list & district 2021	-0.761*** (0.158)	-0.347 ⁺ (0.189)	-0.839*** (0.146)	-0.481** (0.167)	-0.767*** (0.179)	-0.065 (0.225)	-0.512*** (0.127)	-0.180 (0.143)
Age	0.056 (0.443)	0.253 (0.472)	0.821* (0.372)	0.954* (0.395)	0.627 (0.469)	0.920 ⁺ (0.508)	0.250 (0.330)	0.352 (0.344)
Sex: male	0.463** (0.155)	0.597*** (0.163)	0.117 (0.134)	0.190 (0.139)	-0.176 (0.180)	-0.042 (0.193)	0.103 (0.117)	0.168 (0.119)
A-level	0.141 (0.162)	0.005 (0.171)	0.201 (0.141)	0.083 (0.147)	0.292 (0.181)	0.125 (0.193)	0.210 ⁺ (0.124)	0.117 (0.126)
Unemployed	-0.284 (0.628)	-0.497 (0.648)	0.403 (0.608)	0.256 (0.556)	1.596 (1.123)	1.464 (1.110)	0.424 (0.547)	0.314 (0.587)
Economic well-being	1.248*** (0.344)	0.965** (0.355)	1.071*** (0.320)	0.841* (0.331)	1.905*** (0.390)	1.623*** (0.410)	1.847*** (0.292)	1.684*** (0.303)
Pol. interest	-0.501 (0.398)	-0.259 (0.402)	-1.404*** (0.348)	-1.271*** (0.364)	-0.898 ⁺ (0.469)	-0.626 (0.499)	-0.071 (0.297)	0.132 (0.308)
Pol. knowledge	0.108 (0.152)	0.127 (0.157)	0.176 (0.133)	0.168 (0.137)	0.072 (0.168)	0.082 (0.177)	0.075 (0.117)	0.070 (0.121)
Int. efficacy	0.191 (0.381)	0.345 (0.396)	-0.289 (0.327)	-0.177 (0.337)	0.218 (0.427)	0.393 (0.447)	0.050 (0.278)	0.167 (0.284)
L-R placement	-0.547 (0.391)	0.155 (0.427)	0.068 (0.360)	0.663 ⁺ (0.384)	-1.641*** (0.442)	-0.876 ⁺ (0.476)	0.142 (0.311)	0.632 ⁺ (0.325)
Party ID	0.270 (0.201)	0.249 (0.221)	0.250 (0.186)	0.138 (0.198)	0.413 ⁺ (0.215)	0.266 (0.238)	0.264 (0.161)	0.178 (0.168)
Newspaper: nat.	-0.426 (0.636)	-0.791 (0.650)	0.513 (0.567)	0.263 (0.577)	0.497 (0.749)	0.100 (0.774)	0.470 (0.476)	0.223 (0.484)
Newspaper: local	0.785* (0.310)	0.596 ⁺ (0.315)	0.316 (0.261)	0.129 (0.263)	0.146 (0.369)	-0.161 (0.374)	0.142 (0.222)	-0.007 (0.224)
Newspaper: BILD	0.147 (0.359)	0.317 (0.424)	-0.326 (0.298)	-0.164 (0.325)	-0.501 (0.367)	-0.353 (0.396)	-0.595* (0.278)	-0.474 (0.295)
TV: public	0.794** (0.252)	0.437 ⁺ (0.260)	0.905*** (0.207)	0.624** (0.217)	1.367*** (0.281)	0.943** (0.289)	0.789*** (0.189)	0.533** (0.195)
TV: private	-0.340 (0.226)	-0.188 (0.240)	-0.023 (0.214)	0.040 (0.224)	-0.951*** (0.269)	-0.901** (0.289)	-0.537** (0.182)	-0.473* (0.185)
Internet	-0.275 (0.207)	-0.257 (0.219)	0.194 (0.188)	0.268 (0.194)	0.199 (0.235)	0.278 (0.263)	0.147 (0.161)	0.201 (0.166)
AfD voter 2017		-0.492 (0.335)		-1.387*** (0.280)		-0.980** (0.326)		-1.278*** (0.295)
AfD voter 2021		-1.777*** (0.342)		-0.873** (0.306)		-1.671*** (0.352)		-1.361*** (0.335)
Other voter 2017		0.048 (0.460)		-0.668 ⁺ (0.354)		0.589 (0.602)		-0.128 (0.385)
Other voter 2021		-0.199 (0.350)		-0.416 (0.296)		-1.147** (0.358)		-0.506 ⁺ (0.291)
pseudo R^2	0.072	0.119	0.083	0.124	0.140	0.204	0.074	0.110
AIC	1322.771	1265.052	1630.593	1567.572	1074.604	1005.068	1982.668	1913.862
BIC	1430.024	1393.756	1737.845	1696.275	1181.856	1133.772	2089.920	2042.565
N	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576

Binary logistic regression. Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3c. Double winning and losing and perceptions of electoral integrity (2017 and 2021)

	Elections free and fair		Fair chance to present positions		Postal ballots secure		Electoral-integrity index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Winner list & district 2017 (ref.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Winner list & loser district 2017	-0.940** (0.326)	-0.670* (0.319)	-0.578+ (0.298)	-0.334 (0.296)	-0.679 (0.420)	-0.249 (0.412)	-0.609* (0.257)	-0.422+ (0.256)
Loser list & winner district 2017	-0.306 (0.256)	-0.141 (0.264)	-0.114 (0.228)	0.185 (0.241)	0.071 (0.329)	0.546 (0.374)	-0.163 (0.187)	0.031 (0.197)
Loser list & district 2017	-0.582*** (0.175)	-0.093 (0.195)	-0.827*** (0.149)	-0.353* (0.165)	-0.772*** (0.196)	-0.067 (0.226)	-0.728*** (0.131)	-0.379** (0.142)
Winner list & district 2021 (ref.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Winner list & loser district 2021	-0.226 (0.273)	-0.234 (0.268)	-0.225 (0.235)	-0.220 (0.231)	-0.280 (0.309)	-0.288 (0.301)	-0.246 (0.195)	-0.252 (0.192)
Loser list & winner district 2021	-0.434 (0.322)	-0.186 (0.337)	-0.350 (0.278)	-0.162 (0.294)	0.314 (0.444)	0.873+ (0.526)	-0.105 (0.246)	0.077 (0.256)
Loser list & district 2021	-0.783*** (0.162)	-0.396* (0.192)	-0.830*** (0.148)	-0.501** (0.168)	-0.769*** (0.183)	-0.069 (0.229)	-0.507*** (0.129)	-0.209 (0.144)
Age	0.115 (0.444)	0.277 (0.468)	0.911* (0.377)	0.986* (0.395)	0.740 (0.467)	0.941+ (0.505)	0.304 (0.333)	0.385 (0.344)
Sex: male	0.460** (0.157)	0.571*** (0.165)	0.126 (0.136)	0.176 (0.139)	-0.153 (0.182)	-0.058 (0.194)	0.099 (0.119)	0.150 (0.120)
A-level	0.184 (0.163)	0.032 (0.171)	0.246+ (0.143)	0.110 (0.149)	0.313+ (0.183)	0.113 (0.195)	0.262* (0.125)	0.155 (0.128)
Unemployed	-0.310 (0.622)	-0.467 (0.650)	0.324 (0.575)	0.253 (0.550)	1.503 (1.083)	1.515 (1.077)	0.391 (0.538)	0.313 (0.583)
Economic well-being	1.133** (0.351)	0.988** (0.360)	0.854** (0.328)	0.762* (0.333)	1.727*** (0.393)	1.609*** (0.410)	1.689*** (0.295)	1.611*** (0.302)
Pol. interest	-0.389 (0.402)	-0.242 (0.403)	-1.290*** (0.356)	-1.232*** (0.366)	-0.730 (0.478)	-0.606 (0.501)	0.057 (0.300)	0.188 (0.310)
Pol. knowledge	0.109 (0.153)	0.124 (0.158)	0.191 (0.134)	0.181 (0.138)	0.096 (0.169)	0.107 (0.177)	0.082 (0.118)	0.076 (0.121)
Int. efficacy	0.275 (0.381)	0.367 (0.396)	-0.198 (0.329)	-0.168 (0.338)	0.291 (0.429)	0.365 (0.451)	0.148 (0.281)	0.195 (0.285)
L-R placement	-0.862* (0.401)	0.063 (0.447)	-0.367 (0.367)	0.392 (0.401)	-1.999*** (0.451)	-0.965+ (0.506)	-0.238 (0.315)	0.365 (0.333)
Party ID	0.256 (0.202)	0.253 (0.222)	0.242 (0.189)	0.160 (0.198)	0.412+ (0.216)	0.309 (0.237)	0.257 (0.164)	0.191 (0.169)
Newspaper: nat.	-0.356 (0.644)	-0.785 (0.653)	0.680 (0.573)	0.355 (0.574)	0.635 (0.749)	0.120 (0.764)	0.603 (0.479)	0.328 (0.485)
Newspaper: local	0.696* (0.308)	0.600+ (0.312)	0.162 (0.263)	0.073 (0.263)	-0.022 (0.370)	-0.181 (0.373)	0.031 (0.223)	-0.052 (0.224)
Newspaper: BILD	0.171 (0.367)	0.314 (0.423)	-0.343 (0.301)	-0.187 (0.324)	-0.527 (0.377)	-0.377 (0.398)	-0.635* (0.285)	-0.513+ (0.299)
TV: public	0.643* (0.255)	0.426 (0.262)	0.684** (0.210)	0.553* (0.217)	1.123*** (0.276)	0.907** (0.284)	0.612** (0.193)	0.463* (0.198)
TV: private	-0.407+ (0.226)	-0.204 (0.241)	-0.084 (0.216)	0.020 (0.224)	-1.011*** (0.269)	-0.890** (0.290)	-0.592** (0.182)	-0.497** (0.186)
Internet	-0.251 (0.211)	-0.235 (0.221)	0.198 (0.190)	0.262 (0.195)	0.221 (0.238)	0.294 (0.262)	0.148 (0.163)	0.194 (0.167)
AfD voter 2017		-0.455 (0.357)		-1.234*** (0.299)		-1.014** (0.357)		-1.092*** (0.307)
AfD voter 2021		-1.746*** (0.342)		-0.782* (0.308)		-1.602*** (0.355)		-1.290*** (0.338)
Other voter 2017		0.026 (0.464)		-0.526 (0.361)		0.639 (0.593)		0.014 (0.380)
Other voter 2021		-0.125 (0.352)		-0.442 (0.298)		-1.227*** (0.360)		-0.493+ (0.290)
pseudo R^2	0.083	0.122	0.102	0.128	0.156	0.208	0.089	0.115
AIC	1313.419	1266.829	1603.406	1565.540	1061.314	1006.793	1956.090	1910.550
BIC	1436.760	1411.621	1726.747	1710.332	1184.655	1151.585	2079.430	2055.341
N	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576

Binary logistic regression. Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$