

Populism as a Problem of Social Trust?

A Comparative Analysis of European Countries.

Maximilian Filsinger, Markus Freitag and Steffen Wamsler (University of Bern)

*Working paper prepared for the 2020 virtual annual meeting of the DVPW-Arbeitskreis
„Wahlen und politische Einstellungen“*

Please do not cite or redistribute without the authors' permission.

Abstract:

Recent research suggests that the rise of populism largely reflects problems of social integration. To deepen our understanding of this relationship, we evaluate the role of social trust as a cornerstone of social integration. Although we maintain that social trust is connected to right-wing populism, we challenge the notion that all forms of social trust are equally related to populist ideas. Key to this argument is the rigorous distinction between various forms of social trust (particularised, identity-based and generalised trust). Using both original survey data of six European countries and data from 19 countries included in the European Value Study from 2017, we show that notably generalised trust is negatively related to attitudes and party preferences regarding right-wing populism. While the results regarding particularised trust are less conclusive, identity-based trust is positively linked to this exclusionary form of populism measured as both party preference and attitudes. Altogether, our study contributes to the field by refining the social-integrative approach to explain populism.

Introduction

Populism is by now one of the most prominent concepts in contemporary political science (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). With regard to the explanation of populism, scholars conventionally advance two different arguments. On the one hand, proponents of an *economic explanation* argue that economic inequality, technological change and globalisation have increased the demand for populism by creating a group of “left-behinds” (Burgoon *et al.* 2019; Gidron and Mijs 2019; Kriesi *et al.* 2012; Rodrik 2018; Rico and Anduiza 2019). Populist actors address these insecurities, thus achieving electoral success. On the other hand, scholars stressing a *cultural explanation* focus their arguments on the shift in values and traditions, which, for certain groups in society, produce the feeling that their way of life and values are not reflected by the public and elite discourse (Ignazi 1992; Inglehardt and Norris 2017; Ivarsflaten 2008; Oesch 2008).

Recent research, however, shows that (right-wing) populism is explained by combining these two strands of literature (Engler and Weisstanner 2020; Gidron and Hall 2020; Kurer 2020). The lack of a valued economic position or the perception that cultural elites no longer respect one’s views leads to feelings of social disintegration and opens marginalised individuals up to populist parties (Gidron and Hall 2020). The less individuals see themselves as part of a shared normative order, the less they are engaged in social activities and the less they feel social respect, the more likely they are to support radical parties.

To deepen our understanding of the social underpinnings of populism, we evaluate the role of social trust as a cornerstone of social integration. Trust can be regarded as an indication that people see themselves and others embedded in a shared normative order

that protects, values and respects its members, thereby functioning as a prerequisite of social integration (Fukuyama 1995; Offe 1999; Gidron and Hall 2020).

Although we maintain that social trust is connected to right-wing populism, we challenge the notion that all forms of social trust are equally related to populist ideas. Key to this argument is the rigorous distinction between various forms of social trust. Building on previous research, we argue that social trust is a three-dimensional construct, comprising particularised, identity-based and generalised trust (Freitag and Bauer 2013). While particularised trust is exhibited toward people which the individual personally knows from everyday interactions (e.g., friends and family), generalised trust deals with unknown people and does not predominantly depend upon specific situations. Unlike these two forms, identity-based trust relates to people whom one does not have a personal relationship with but with whom one shares certain important aspects of (social) identity such as language, nationality or religion.

In order to test our arguments, we rely on a variety of survey data. First, we use an original survey that covers six Western European countries. Second, we extend our analysis with the latest European Value Study from 2017, including 19 Eastern and Western European democracies. We test our hypotheses using both right-wing populist attitudes and support of right-wing populist parties. Our empirical models show that notably generalised trust is consistently related to right-wing populism in a negative way, while identity-based trust is linked positively to support for right-wing populism. High levels of particularised trust tend to be connected negatively to this form of populism, albeit less systematically.

We contribute to the literature in three important ways. First, we extend the literature of the social-integrative underpinnings of the support for populism by

evaluating the role of social trust. Furthermore, advancing former research endeavours, we disentangle different dimensions of social trust and make more concrete, yet comprehensive, arguments about how different forms of social trust relate to populism by proposing distinct theoretical arguments. By doing so, our study reinforces the importance of distinguishing between three distinct dimensions of social trust, that is particularised, identity-based, and generalised trust. Second, we measure support for right-wing populism comprehensively and do not rely solely on either attitudes or party preferences. Third, we test our arguments with data from different European countries combining different survey data, thereby applying our argument to both different cultural, economic and institutional contexts as well as recent political developments in the respective European countries.

Conceptualising right-wing populism

It is common wisdom that populism is a contested concept, yet scholars increasingly agree on one particular approach to populism, the ideational approach (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018; Mudde 2007). This approach “locate[s] populism in the realm of ideas and highlight[s] the central place of a so-called popular identity as well as its antagonistic relationship with a putative, vilified elite that stands as the anti-people” (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 516). According to Mudde (2007: 23) populism can be defined as a “*thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and*

*which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”.*¹

Populism in this sense is a moralistic rather than programmatic ideology with the concept of “the people” being of central importance (Mudde 2004). The normative distinction is between “the people” and “the elite” and symbolises the Manichean outlook on society: the struggle between “good” and “bad”. Empirically, scholars often observe that populism is attached to other world views and thus form certain subtypes of populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013).

Right-wing populism combines a populist ideology with nativism and authoritarianism (Betz 2017; Mudde 2007; 2010; Oesch 2008; Rooduijn 2014). According to Betz (2017), nativism relates to hostility towards anything that is foreign and poses a threat to national cohesion or identity. Put differently, nativism is an ideology “which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (Mudde 2007: 19). Authoritarianism describes “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely” (Mudde 2007: 23). Authoritarians, “emphasize the need for order, quick responses to threats to order, and support for authorities who can maintain order” (Aguilar and Carlin 2018: 398). It is argued that especially vulnerable individuals are trying to cope with their situation by striving for traditions and old rules that were guiding a predictable society (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012).

¹ As opposed to full ideologies, thin ideologies have “a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts” (Freedman 1998, p. 750). Consequently, these thin ideologies do not offer answers to all social, political or economic questions but rather focus on a smaller set of questions, and in the case of populism, on the antagonistic relationship between “the people” and “the elite”.

Explaining Populism: Social integration as a theoretical framework

To explain populism, scholarly research mostly focuses on two theoretically distinct accounts, i.e. economic and cultural explanations. Proponents of the economic approach argue that processes associated with globalisation and modernisation have created winners and losers thereof (Kriesi *et al.* 2006; Kriesi *et al.* 2012). While the winners with their higher levels of education, economic security and human capital in general profit from open borders, integrated markets and global competition, the losers feel threatened by economic and cultural competition (Kriesi *et al.* 2012). Kriesi and colleagues (2012) emphasise the economic insecurities and vulnerabilities especially of those with a lower education and lower income, i.e. with lower socio-economic status. Populist actors respond to this demand by offering seemingly simple answers to the concerns of the (economically) marginalised, in particular by putting the people and the nation first (Engler and Weisstanner 2020). Recent research has supported this line of reasoning and finds that economic vulnerability, grievances and negative perceptions about the national economy positively relate to populism, while people who experience income losses are also more likely to support populist parties (Burgoon *et al.* 2019; Gidron and Mijs 2019; Rico and Anduiza 2019).

Opposed to this explanation, proponents of the cultural explanation argue that globalisation cannot be confined to economic processes, but that it also implies “a cultural evolution in which a particular cosmopolitan identity is being actively promoted” (Spruyt *et al.* 2016: 337). Consequently, one can observe a shift in values and traditions leading people to feel that their way of life and values are not reflected by the public and elite discourse (Ignazi 1992; Inglehardt and Norris 2017). In particular, immigration and its

effects such as increased diversity are often regarded as a threat to national identity (Mudde 2007). As such, immigration not only threatens the economy of the country but – more importantly – its culture and traditions (Mudde 2007; Oesch 2008; Bonikowski 2017). Studies found that populist radical right parties mobilise very successfully on these issues (Ivarsflaten 2008; Oesch 2008).

Research on social integration and social isolation processes proposes a different account of populist party support (Gidron and Hall 2020; Rydgren 2009, 2011). Referring to mass society theory, Rydgren (2009, 2011), for example, argues that growing atomisation and the loss of togetherness and community spur a longing for new identities. Thus, people left unattached to modern society are susceptible to mobilising efforts by charismatic (populist) leaders, who promise new identities and offer ‘quasi-communities’ (Kornhauser 1959). In addition, recent contributions on this account conclude that focusing on either economic or cultural explanations constitute a conceptualisation of populism that is too rigid to meet reality (Gidron and Hall 2020). Here, ethnographic studies found that globalisation and modernisation made certain people feel not only economically and culturally vulnerable, but at the same time socially marginalised and disrespected by and in society, thereby promoting populist support (Hochschild 2016). Thus, populism is explained neither solely on economic nor on cultural grounds but rather by the subjective assessment of socio-integrational consequences of the economic and cultural developments associated with globalisation and modernisation. Economic and cultural distortions ensure that individuals no longer feel respected, complain of a lack of social recognition, feel socially marginalised and no longer feel part of the common order. Consequently, following Gidron and Hall (2020: 1031), social integration describes a multidimensional phenomenon “based on (a) the degree to which individuals see

themselves as part of a shared normative order, (b) their levels of social interaction with others, and (c) the extent to which they feel recognized or respected by others in society”.

While Gidron and Hall (2020: 1031) refer to the subjective social status of people “defined as their beliefs about where they stand relative to others in society” as a measure of “how well people are integrated into society”, we propose to use social trust as a cornerstone of social integration instead (cf. Uslaner 2002). Social trust mirrors the three components of social integration in a meaningful way. First, following Fukuyama (1995: 26), trust is “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community”. Thus, social trust is linked to people’s belief of being part of a shared normative order with commonly shared ideas of fairness, justice, security and equality (Warren 2018; Gidron and Hall 2020). In this regard, while trust in others is often seen as a key resource for the development of inclusive and cooperative societies, a lack thereof can produce polarisation and support for divisive political positions. Second, trusting another person is a vital part of individuals’ levels of interaction with others. Even more so, as a certain amount of trust is a prerequisite for the most basic forms of cooperation in our economic, political, and social relationships (Freitag and Bühlmann 2009; Paxton and Ressler 2018). Third, recognition and respect from others (and vice versa) relate to social trust (Jung and Kwon 2011). People trust when their rights are recognised, or the obligations of others toward them are respected (Sztompka 1998).

With regard to the scope of the phenomenon, one can generally identify three distinct kinds of social trust (Bauer and Freitag 2018; Freitag and Bauer 2013).² In

² Some scholars have argued that social trust is a one-dimensional concept where individuals display the same level of trust irrespective of the trustee (Whiteley 2000). People would trust their family members, their friends and neighbours as much as they trust strangers or people they meet the first time in general. Yet, today this conceptualisation is seldom used and has been refuted by different studies (Freitag and

addition to the most common distinction between trust towards close people (referring to those one interacts with on a daily basis and has an existing relationship with, e.g. family, friends or co-workers) and trust in strangers or generalised trust (Delhey *et al.* 2011; Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Uslaner 2002), scholars have suggested there is an additional dimension that captures people who are not known personally but who share certain characteristics with the trustor such as nationality, religion or language. This dimension is referred to as identity-based trust (Freitag and Bauer 2013; Kenworthy and Jones 2009). Drawing on social identity theory developed by Tajfel (1974) and Tajfel and Turner (1979), this conception of trust mainly rests on identification and categorisation. Shared identity may include behavioural similarities, geographical proximities and the notion of a common fate, mores, ethnicity or traditions (Stolle 2002: 401). The assumption here is that people who share a common identity are more likely to trust each other (even if they do not know each other personally). In addition, Hooghe (2007) argues that actors often base their (trust) decisions on heuristics such as resemblance or similarity (perceptions), making higher levels of trust in people with higher resemblance more likely. Identity-based trust can be regarded as a form of trust that is distinct from particularised and generalised trust (Bauer and Freitag 2018). First, identity-based trust differs from particularised trust in that the trustor trusts another person without personal knowledge or contact. As Freitag and Bauer (2013: 26) put it, “personal experience with the target of trust is therefore not a prerequisite to having a high or low level of this type of social trust”. While particularised trust requires personal knowledge, identity-based trust is formed based on information acquired by common (group) membership (*ibid.*).

Bauer 2013; Newton and Zmerli 2011). Other studies have suggested the more common two-dimensional structure of social trust that distinguishes between trust towards close people (referring to people that one interacts with on a daily basis and has an existing relationship with, e.g. family, friends or co-workers) and trust in strangers or generalised trust (Delhey *et al.* 2011; Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Uslaner 2002). Based on empirical and theoretical reasons, we prefer the three-dimensional structure explained below.

Person A regards person B as trustworthy not because of a personal connection but because both have, for example, the same nationality.³ Second, identity-based trust differs from generalised trust in that individuals hold information about the trustee based on their shared group membership and previous experiences with other members of this group (Freitag and Bauer 2013). Overall, this leads us to employ a three-dimensional structure of trust.

Hypotheses

We investigate the relationship between social trust as a measure for social integration and populism by taking into account the multi-dimensionality of social trust. We formulate hypotheses for the different forms of social trust introduced above. Starting with particularised trust, we argue that those who trust their close social environment have the certainty of a backup option of shared values where recognition and respect are important elements. Conversely, a lack of trust in people in your immediate environment is a sign of severe social disintegration and marginalisation. A lack of trust in close people leaves the individual in need of a new community where they can feel safe and secure (Arendt 1973; Rydgren 2009; 2011). Consequently, we expect that individuals with low levels of particularised trust are prone to right-wing populist ideas that offer a new sense of community and social identity. We formulate hypothesis 1 as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Particularised trust is negatively related to right-wing populism.

³ Freitag and Bauer (2013), however, remind us that such judgments might be based on personal experiences with other people belonging to the same category. Thus, “there is no doubt that prior first- or second-hand experiences with strangers will influence one’s current expectations of them” Freitag and Traummüller (2009: 789). Consequently, trust decisions are shaped by both predispositions as well as experiences.

In contrast to particularised trust, identity-based trust concerns trust for a specific purpose. Because I am looking for protection and security, I trust my closest environment, my family or my friends. Because I want to protect my interests towards others, I trust people who share my identity. Thus, this kind of social trust focuses only on one particular, narrowly definable part of society, usually accompanied by out-group derogation (Kenworthy and Jones 2009; Navarro-Carrillo *et al.* 2018). Identity-based trust challenges the societally shared normative order and provokes at least partial social disintegration. Identity-based trust relies on the demarcation to people who belong to a different category. People with strong identity-based trust see no common interests with other groups. They declare individuals from other groups to be out-groups that are not trustworthy. Thus, identity-based trust “excludes persons with specific characteristics”, which increases in-group favouritism and out-group derogation, thereby making people susceptible to right-wing populist messages that resonate with such in-group favouritism (Torpe and Lolle 2011: 489). For example, trusting people who share the same ethnicity or nationality increases in-group identification and strengthens the demarcation *vis-à-vis* people with a different nationality. In other words: As far as identity-based trust is based in particular on characteristics such as nationality and ethnicity, such forms of trust will go hand in hand with right-wing populism. Hypothesis 2 is therefore formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Identity-based trust is positively related to right-wing populism.

As opposed to identity-based trust, placing trust in others generally is a statement of toleration of differing ideas (Uslaner 2002: 18). Generalised trust, with its integrative vision allows overcoming boundary-making and strong in-group-outgroup distinctions.

As opposed to the other forms of trust, generalised trust is not a trust decision for specific purposes but rather a general and integrative vision of society. People who are generally trusting regard themselves as part of a shared normative order and, more importantly, they have the impression that others share this view and respect the shared norms. In this regard, people who have low levels of generalised trust feel socially marginalised or excluded from society. This increases frustration and anger and makes people susceptible to populist messages which aim to restore a common normative order that constitutes a new community for those feeling neglected or left behind (Gidron and Hall 2020; Hochschild 2016). Further, as generalised trust includes “everyone” and right-wing populism is characterised by a conflictual and exclusionary vision of society that includes an inherent in-group-out-group distinction, this results in substantial incompatibility between these two notions (Torpe and Lolle 2011). More concretely, while generalised trust extends to people of a different ethnicity or nationality favouring a transnational normative order of togetherness, these groups are often regarded as the hostile “other” in right-wing populist discourse. Especially immigrants or people of different ethnicity are regarded as a threat to national unity and popular sovereignty (Mudde 2007; 2010).⁴ Thus, we formulate hypothesis 3 as follows:

Hypothesis 3: Generalised trust is negatively related to right-wing populism.

⁴ Berning and Ziller (2017) argue that generalised trust reduces the likelihood of rejecting outgroups on the basis of the perception that the world is dangerous and essentially competitive. Using survey data from the Netherlands they find that generalised trust is negatively related to right-wing populist party preference and this relationship is mediated by anti-immigrant sentiments. Individuals with higher levels of generalised trust have more positive attitudes towards immigrants and are thus less likely to support a populist radical-right party.

Research design

In the remainder of the paper, we put the relationships outlined above to an empirical test. In doing so, we use two different surveys. First, we employ original survey data with quota-sampling conducted in April and May 2020 in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The description of the survey and descriptive statistics are presented in the supplemental material. Second, we use survey data from the European Values Study 2017/18 to test our claims with a broader sample of countries (EVS 2019). In the EVS, we include all countries with a right-wing populist party that has a substantially large share of votes. This classification of populism is drawn from the PopuList (Rooduijn *et al.* 2019). The list of parties and respective countries can be found in table A1 in the appendix. We include 19 Western and Eastern European democracies: Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Our approach to measuring right-wing populism is twofold. First, in the six-country study we follow recent research that measures populist attitudes. We use three sets of items to measure the respective dimensions of right-wing populism: populist, nativist and authoritarian attitudes (for exact wording see table A2). To capture right-wing populism as a multidimensional concept we follow Mohrenberg *et al.* (2019). We sum up the items of each dimension separately and then take the geometric mean of the three dimensions and rescale the variable from 0 to 1. Mohrenberg *et al.* (2019) argue that this procedure ensures that people who score 0 on either dimension of populism have an overall 0 on the combined populism scale. This matches our conceptualisation of populism as we view each dimension as a constituent and thus necessary part of populism. Consequently, we avoid high values on one dimension compensating low values on the

other dimension (Wuttke *et al.* 2020). The index ranges from 0 (no populism) to 1 (high levels of populism). The exact wording of the items can be found in the appendix. To test the robustness of our measure we also generate a party preference variable in the six-country study. Second, in the analyses using the EVS, we use right-wing populist party preferences. Following the PopuList (Rooduijn *et al.* 2019), we categorise the respective parties as either populist or not and then generate a variable that measures whether a respondent prefers a right-wing populist party to other parties.

Our main independent variable, social trust, is measured as follows: In the six-country study, we are able to use a measure of the three forms of social trust that fit our conceptualisation outlined above. Particularised trust is measured by two items: (1) Trust in family and (2) trust in friends. Identity-based trust is gauged with two items that ask how much people trust people they do not know personally but share the same (1) nationality and (2) speak the same language. Lastly, generalised trust is measured by (1) the question of whether people trust a generalised other and (2) how much people trust people they meet for the first time. Factor analysis with maximum-likelihood estimation and promax rotation supports this three-dimensional structure (Table A3).

The measurement of social trust in the EVS is slightly different. In this sample, particularised trust is measured with (1) trust in family and (2) trust in people personally known. Identity-based trust is evaluated with two items that ask how much people trust people of another (1) religion or (2) nationality. While this measure does not directly measure trust in people with the same identity traits, we follow the literature by arguing that these categories separate individuals with different identities from the respondent, or as Freitag and Bauer (2013: 29f) put it: “the trust we have in a certain group that shares our identity is defined by the boundaries that separate our group from other categories and groups.” Generalised trust is measured with the same questions as in the six-country

survey. While these two measurement approaches are not perfectly equivalent, the EVS constitutes the only recent large-scale, cross-national dataset with which we can generalise our finding in cross-country country setting. Factor analysis with maximum-likelihood estimation and promax rotation supports this three-dimensional structure (table A4). Additionally, we compare the model fit indices of one-, two- and three-dimensional structures and find additional support for the three-dimensional structure (see table A5). Accordingly, we construct three different additive indexes for the three forms of trust.

Furthermore, we introduce a range of potential control variables that have been shown to be influential for the relationships under study. Existing studies provide evidence that women are less likely to prefer populist parties. Thus, we include sex measured with female as the reference. Age also matters for radical voting and to account for this, we control for age measured in years. We use the squared term to check whether this relationship might be non-linear. A lot of previous research suggests that people's social and economic positions influence whether they support populist parties of the left or the right. Therefore, we use three measures to account for the dimensionality of social and economic vulnerability: education, income and subjective social status. For an attitudinal control, we include the left-right self-placement as an additional control. We use the squared term to account for the u-shaped effect of politically extreme positions. Lastly, we include satisfaction with democracy as the control variable as research has shown that discontent is an important correlate of populist support (Rooduijn *et al.* 2016). Summary statistics can be found in tables A6 and A7.⁵

⁵ With minor exceptions, the control variables are the same in both data sets. In our six-country study, we operationalise income with the self-reported income situation while in the EVS we make use of the income decile. Furthermore, subjective social status is only included in the original survey data.

Methodologically our approach is twofold. When investigating right-wing populist attitudes, we rely on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. However, when we use populist party preference as the dependent variable, we use linear probability models to account for this variable's binary structure. In all models, respondents are nested within countries. Thus, we include country fixed-effects and use robust standard errors. As we are not interested in the direct effects of country-level variables, the models with country fixed-effects and robust standard errors are appropriate as they are more robust than multi-level models because they control for all potential differences between the countries.

Empirical results


Below, we present the results of our empirical models which were estimated separately for the different data sets. Starting with right-wing populist *attitudes* based on the six-country survey, we find that people who are more trusting towards people they know personally have lower levels of right-wing populist attitudes (upper left panel of figure 1; full models in table A8). The coefficient is significant. This finding supports hypothesis 1 which states that people who are socially integrated in a network of close people they trust are less supportive of right-wing populist positions. Conversely, for identity-based trust and with regard to hypothesis 2, we see a significant positive relationship with right-wing populist attitudes. This positive coefficient implies that people who have more trust in those who share the same nationality and speak the same language have higher levels of right-wing populist attitudes. In addition, we can see that generalised trust is negatively related to right-wing populist attitudes. Respondents who show higher levels of generalised trust are less supportive of right-wing populist positions, thus supporting

hypothesis 3. These results clearly show that different dimensions of trust vary in their relationship with right-wing populism.

We replicate these findings using right-wing populist party preference as a dependent variable in the same data set. First, again looking at the six-country study (upper right panel of figure 1), we see that while particularised trust is not significantly related to right-wing populist party preference, people with high levels of identity-based trust are significantly more likely to prefer a right-wing populist party, corroborating the findings for populist attitudes. Furthermore, higher generalised trust again reduces the proclivity to support right-wing populism. Put differently, people with high levels of generalised trust are less likely to support a right-wing populist party.

A short note on the control variables for the models using the six-country study (see table A8). Men have significantly higher levels of populist attitudes than women but are not more likely to prefer a right-wing populist party. Age has an inversed u-shaped relationship with attitudes but not with party preference. Moreover, people who have a higher level of education have lower levels of right-wing populist attitudes and are less likely to prefer right-wing populist parties. Furthermore, people with higher levels of education are less prone to support right-wing populism. Income only affects right-wing populist attitudes, i.e. the more comfortably a person lives on their income, the less populist. Subjective social status is not significant. In addition, satisfaction with democracy has the expected negative relationship in both models. Lastly, left-right-self placement also has a positive relationship in the populist attitudes model and a slightly u-shaped relationship in the party preference model.

Figure 1 Coefficient plot for the relationship between different forms of social trust and right-wing populist attitudes and right-wing populist party preference




Notes: Estimates are based on the models with all control variables and country fixed-effects. Displayed 95% (light grey bars) and 90% (black bars). The upper left panel is based on OLS-regression, while the upper right and the lower panel are based on linear probability models.

To apply our argument to different cases at a different point in time, we conducted the same analysis with data from the EVS (lower panel of figure 1; full models in table A9). Again, particularised trust is not significantly related to right-wing populist party preference in the 19 countries under study. Conversely, identity-based trust is significantly linked to preferring a right-wing populist party, corroborating earlier findings from the six-country study. In addition, generalised trust is negatively linked to preference for a right-wing populist party. In sum, the results from the EVS support the findings of the six-country study.

For the control variables in the EVS model we find that men are significantly more likely to prefer a right-wing populist party than women (see table A9). Moreover, people

with higher incomes and/or who have a higher education are less likely to prefer right-wing populist parties. Furthermore, people who place themselves more to the right of the political spectrum are naturally also more likely to prefer such a party. The relationship is non-linear as shown by the significant coefficient of the squared term. People who are satisfied with the functioning of democracy are less likely to prefer a right-wing populist party.

Figure 3 Predicted marginal effects of social trust with 95% and 99% confidence intervals



Notes: Estimates are based on the models with all control variables and country fixed-effects. Displayed 95% (light grey bars) and 99% (black bars) confidence intervals. Panel A is based on the six-country study. Panel B shows the results based on the EVS sample.

Regarding the substantiality of the results, figure 2 shows marginal effects and the predicted probabilities based on the models with populist attitudes referring to our six country study (upper panel A) and the populist party preference model based on the EVS study (lower panel B). Regarding particularised trust, the upper left panel in panel A

shows that people who do not trust close people have a populist score of around .25 compared to .19 for those who fully trust their friends and relatives. In the EVS sample, particularised trust is not significant (lower left panel).

For identity-based trust, the difference between low and high levels of trust in one's in-group is around .1 (from .16 to .26), which amounts to nearly half a standard deviation. In the EVS sample, identity-based trust shows a difference of around 15 percentage points between low and high levels of identity-based trust, indicating that people with the highest level of identity-based trust have a 25 per cent probability of preferring a right-wing populist party to any other party.

Lastly, the coefficient for generalised trust in the six-country study amounts to a difference between low and high levels of trust of around .11 (from .25 to .14), which is more than half a standard deviation regarding populist attitudes. In the EVS sample, the difference is also around eight percentage points (figure 2, right figure in panel B). Overall, we consider the relationships between identity-based trust and generalised trust with right-wing populist party preference as substantial and robust.

We performed several robustness checks to see whether our conclusions hold. First, in the six-country study, we checked whether the relationship between the different forms of trust and right-wing populist attitudes is driven by the populist attitudes or by the attached host ideology. Thus, we separated our composite measurement and re-estimated our original model (table A10). The results reveal that generalised trust is negatively related to all dimensions of a right-wing populist ideology. Moreover, identity-based trust is positively related to all dimensions of right-wing populism. Thus, the relationships we found in our original model are not solely driven by the similarity between identity-based trust and nativism. More importantly, particularised trust, again,

is negatively related to all dimensions, except authoritarianism. Second, as the six-country survey was conducted during the coronavirus pandemic, we tested whether including measures of affectedness distorts our results. Table A11 reveals that our conclusions hold when introducing additional measures of coronavirus affectedness.

Conclusion

Populism is a highly debated topic and the controversies about its definition, explanation and consequences transcend the academic sphere. Aside from the economic and cultural explanations of populism, recent research has coined populism as a “problem of social integration” (Gidron and Hall 2020). We tap into this line of research and expand the arguments by proposing that social trust is a meaningful and encompassing measure of social integration. Social trust is linked to the belief of being part of a shared normative order and a lack thereof is thus regarded as a form of social marginalisation that results in increasing support for populism (Gidron and Hall 2020). Yet, to analyse the relationship between social trust and populism profoundly we have to account for different forms of social trust. The three-dimensional structure of trust – particularised, identity-based and generalised trust – allows us to make concrete arguments to explain right-wing populism. We find that generalised trust is consistently and negatively related to right-wing populist party preference, supporting our argument that the exclusionist and horizontally dualistic positions of right-wing populism are unattractive to people who are part of a transnational shared normative order by means of trusting others not to harm them. Conversely, identity-based trust seems to resonate well with the exclusionist position of right-wing populists, as people who are more trusting towards those with the same nationality are consistently more likely to support a right-wing populist party. For

particularised trust, we find a significant relationship with populist attitudes only, not with party preference. While the latter echoes null findings on social isolation and party preferences, the former warrants additional attention (see Rydgren 2009). One possible explanation for the different results is that the lack of close social support also isolates the respondent from mobilising efforts of right-wing populist parties and thus they abstain from elections altogether despite ideological congruence with right-wing populist parties.

Our study underpins the importance of distinguishing between several dimensions of social trust. If we had followed the conventional view and only distinguished between two types of trust (particularised and generalised), we would have missed out on valuable and differentiated findings, especially regarding the importance of identity-based trust. Moreover, we measure the tendency towards right-wing populism with both an attitudinal as well as party preference approach. While the latter has been used throughout the literature, our measurement for right-wing populist attitudes follows recent advances in the study of populist attitudes which allows us to obtain much more nuanced results (Mohrenberg *et al.* 2019). These results reveal that the influence of the dimensions of social trust holds for right-wing populist attitudes as well as party preference which support the robustness of the findings and the measurement of populist attitudes.

Furthermore, we provide evidence that not all forms of social integration are equally associated with populism and it is necessary to differentiate between them. What is important is not only whether the form of social integration promises protection, recognition, respect, and belonging to shared value systems that entail a certain immunity to populist ideas. It is also important whether the form of social integration goes hand in hand with distinguishing, safeguarding and pursuing one's own interests vis-à-vis out-groups. If this is the case, social integration cannot be regarded as a safeguard against

populism. In this regard, being integrated in a tight in-group might even increase the susceptibility to populist ideas and excluding discourses.

According to our analyses, the decisive barrier against populist ideas is generalised trust. This kind of trust is a rather abstract attitude toward people in general, encompassing those beyond one's immediate familiarity, including strangers (e.g., random people one meets on the street). It is precisely this form of social trust, which is regarded as the driving force for efficient economic processes and which is seen in the eyes of many as the bedrock of democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993; Whiteley 2000).

Experiences and predispositions ranging beyond the everyday sphere as well as extending past the borders of a well-defined personal environment generate generalised trust. Experiences outside one's narrow circle of everyday interactions, such as contact with unknown people have an impact on generalised trust. The same should hold true for predispositions as well. Psychological predispositions relevant for coping with situations outside the immediate realm of control and familiarity should accompany generalised trust (Freitag and Traunmüller 2009). With regard to the most important contextual factors, studies find that countries whose authorities are seen as incorruptible, whose institutions of the welfare state reduce income disparities, and whose political interests are represented in a manner proportional to their weight have citizens that are more likely to promote generalised trust (Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Freitag and Bühlmann 2009).

Naturally, our study has several caveats that offer potential for future research. First, we only focus on right-wing populism and thus cannot transfer our results to left-wing populist attitudes or party preference. As left-wing populist parties often attach a more inclusive worldview to their populist mind-set, future research should investigate

how social trust is related to left-wing populism. Second, our data only allows us to evaluate the relationship cross-sectionally which prevents us from drawing any causal inferences. In general, it is conceivable that the relationship effect between trust and populism can run in both directions. Various studies show, however, that trust changes rather slowly at the societal and individual levels, thus holding that trust is generally a stable propensity (Uslaner 2002). Following this perspective, individual differences in personality traits developed early on may be responsible for differences in trust between individuals (Freitag and Bauer 2016; Sztompka 1998; Uslaner 2002). If, in turn, interpersonal trust can be considered an innate part of the personality, this indicates a causal direction: trust activates populist attitudes and preferences. Nevertheless, future research should continue the effort to use data collected over time or within experimental conditions to illuminate the relationship between different explanatory variables and populism. Using time-series data could possibly help to shed light on the dynamics of the relationship between social trust and populism.

References

- Aguilar, Rosario, and Ryan E. Carlin (2018). 'Populist voters: the role of voter authoritarianism and ideology', in: Kirk Hawkins, Ryan E. Carlin, Levente Littvay and Cristóbal R. Kaltwasser (eds.), *The Ideational Approach to Populism. Concept, Theory, and Analysis*. Milton: Routledge, 396–418.
- Almond, G.A. & Verba, S. (1963). *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Arendt, Hannah (1973). *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company.

- Bauer, Paul C., and Markus Freitag (2018). 'Measuring Trust', in: Eric M. Uslaner (ed.), *The Oxford handbook of social and political trust*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 15–36.
- Berning, Carl C., and Conrad Ziller (2017). 'Social trust and radical right-wing populist party preferences', *Acta Politica*, 52:2, 198–217.
- Betz, Hans-Georg (2017). 'Nativism Across Time and Space', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 23:4, 335–53.
- Bonikowski, Bart (2017). 'Ethno-nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 68:S1, 181-S213.
- Burgoon, Brian, Sam van Noort, Matthijs Rooduijn, and Geoffrey Underhill (2019). 'Positional Deprivation and Support for Radical Right and Radical Left Parties', *Economic Policy*, Online First.
- Delhey, Jan, Kenneth Newton, and Christian Welzel (2011). 'How General Is Trust in "Most People"? Solving the Radius of Trust Problem', *American Sociological Review*, 76:5, 786–807.
- Elchardus, Mark, and Bram Spruyt (2012). 'The contemporary contradictions of egalitarianism: an empirical analysis of the relationship between the old and new left/right alignments', *European Political Science Review*, 4:2, 217–39.
- Engler, Sarah, and David Weisstanner (2020). 'The threat of social decline: income inequality and radical right support', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 68:1, 1–21.
- EVS (2019). 'European Values Study 2017, Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017), ZA7500, Data file Version 2.0.0'.
<https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=7500&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.13314>.
- Freitag, Markus, and Paul C. Bauer (2013). 'Testing for Measurement Equivalence in Surveys. Dimensions of Social Trust across Cultural Contexts', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 77:S1, 24–44.
- Freitag, Markus, and Marc Bühlmann (2009). 'Crafting Trust. The Role of Political Institutions in Comparative Perspective', *Comparative Political Studies*, 42:12, 1537–66.

- Freitag, Markus, and Richard Traunmüller (2009). 'Spheres of trust: An empirical analysis of the foundations of particularised and generalised trust', *European Journal of Political Research*, 48:6, 782–803.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1995). *Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: Free Press.
- Gidron, Noam, and Peter A. Hall (2020). 'Populism as a Problem of Social Integration', *Comparative Political Studies*, 53:7, 1027-1059.
- Gidron, Noam, and Jonathan J. B. Mijs (2019). 'Do Changes in Material Circumstances Drive Support for Populist Radical Parties? Panel Data Evidence from the Netherlands during the Great Recession, 2007-2015', *European Sociological Review*, 35:5, 637–50.
- Hawkins, Kirk A., and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). 'The Ideational Approach to Populism', *Latin American Research Review*, 52:4, 513–28.
- Hawkins, Kirk A., and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2018). 'Introduction: the ideational approach', in: Kirk Hawkins, Ryan E. Carlin, Levente Littvay and Cristóbal R. Kaltwasser (eds.), *The Ideational Approach to Populism. Concept, Theory, and Analysis*. Milton: Routledge, 1–24.
- Hochschild, Arlie R. (2016). *Strangers in their own land. Anger and mourning on the American right*. New York, London: The New Press.
- Hooghe, Marc (2007). 'Social Capital and Diversity Generalized Trust, Social Cohesion and Regimes of Diversity', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 40:3, 709–32.
- Ignazi, Piero (1992). 'The Silent Counter-Revolution', *European Journal of Political Research*, 22:1, 3–34.
- Inglehardt, Ronald F., and Pippa Norris (2017). 'Trump and the Xenophobic Populist Parties. The Silent Revolution in Reverse', *Perspectives on Politics*, 15:2, 443–54.
- Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth (2008). 'What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?', *Comparative Political Studies*, 41:1, 3–23.
- Jung, Jinkyung, and Eunsun Kwon (2011). 'Trust Development in Volunteering An Exploratory Study of Social Trust and Volunteer Activities in Korea', *International Review of Public Administration*, 16:1, 157–79.

- Kenworthy, Jared B., and Jennifer Jones (2009). 'The Roles of Group Importance and Anxiety in Predicting Depersonalized Ingroup Trust', *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 12:2, 227–39.
- Kornhauser, William (1959). *The Politics of Mass Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Dominic Höglinger, Swen Hutter, and Bruno Wüest, eds. (2012). *Political Conflict in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey (2006). 'Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared', *European Journal of Political Research*, 45:6, 921–56.
- Kurer, Thomas (2020). 'The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status, and the Populist Right', *Comparative Political Studies*, 53:10-11, 1798–835.
- Mohrenberg, Steffen, Robert A. Huber, and Tina Freyburg (2019). 'Love at first sight? Populist attitudes and support for direct democracy', *Party Politics*, Online first.
- Mudde, Cas (2004). 'The Populist Zeitgeist', *Government and Opposition*, 39:4, 542–63.
- Mudde, Cas (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, Cas (2010). 'The Populist Radical Right. A Pathological Normalcy', *West European Politics*, 33:6, 1167–86.
- Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2013). 'Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America', *Government and Opposition*, 48:2, 147–74.
- Navarro-Carrillo, Ginés, Inmaculada Valor-Segura, Luis M. Lozano, and Miguel Moya (2018). 'Do Economic Crises Always Undermine Trust in Others? The Case of Generalized, Interpersonal, and In-Group Trust.', *Frontiers in psychology*, 9, 1955.
- Newton, Ken, and Sonja Zmerli (2011). 'Three forms of trust and their association', *European Political Science Review*, 3:2, 169–200.

- Oesch, Daniel (2008). 'Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland', *International Political Science Review*, 29:3, 349–73.
- Offe, Claus (1999). 'How can we trust our fellow citizens?', in: Mark E. Warren (ed.), *Democracy and Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 42–87.
- Paxton, Pamela, and Robert W. Ressler (2018). 'Trust and Participation in Associations', in: Eric M. Uslander (ed.), *The Oxford handbook of social and political trust*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Putnam, R.D. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rico, Guillem, and Eva Anduiza (2019). 'Economic correlates of populist attitudes: an analysis of nine european countries in the aftermath of the great recession', *Acta Politica*, 54, 371–97.
- Rodrik, Dani (2018). 'Populism and the economics of globalization', *Journal of International Business Policy*, 1:1-2, 12–33.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs (2014). 'Vox populismus: a populist radical right attitude among the public?', *Nations and Nationalism*, 20:1, 80–92.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs, Wouter van der Brug, and Sarah L. de Lange (2016). 'Expressing or fuelling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent', *Electoral Studies*, 43, 32–40.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs, Stijn van Kessel, Caterina Froio, Andrea L.P. Pirro, Sarah de Lange, Daphne Halikiopoulou, Paul Lewis, Cas Mudde, and Paul A. Taggart (2019). 'The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe.'. www.popu-list.org.
- Rothstein, Bo, Dietlind Stolle(2008). 'The State and Social Capital: An Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust'. *Comparative Politics*, 40:4, 441–459.
- Rydgren, Jens (2009). 'Social Isolation? Social Capital and Radical Right-wing Voting in Western Europe', *Journal of Civil Society*, 5:2, 129–50.
- Rydgren, Jens (2011). 'A legacy of 'uncivicness'? Social capital and radical right-wing populist voting in Eastern Europe', *Acta Politica*, 46:2, 132–57.

- Spruyt, Bram, Gil Keppens, and Filip van Droogenbroeck (2016). 'Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to It?', *Political Research Quarterly*, 69:2, 335–46.
- Stolle, Dietlind (2002). 'Trusting in strangers - the concept of generalized trust in perspective', *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 31:4, 397–412.
- Sztompka, Piotr (1998). 'Trust, Distrust and Two Paradoxes of Democracy', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 1:1, 19–32.
- Tajfel, Henri (1974). 'Social identity and intergroup behaviour', *Information (International Social Science Council)*, 13:2, 65–93.
- Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner (1979). 'The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior', in: Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations*. Chicago, Ill.: Nelson-Hall, 1–24.
- Torpe, Lars, and Henrik Lolte (2011). 'Identifying Social Trust in Cross-Country Analysis: Do We Really Measure the Same?', *Social Indicators Research*, 103:3, 481–500.
- Uslaner, Eric M. (2002). *The moral foundations of social trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Warren, Mark E. (2018). 'Trust and Democracy', in: Eric M. Uslaner (ed.), *The Oxford handbook of social and political trust*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Whiteley, Paul F. (2000). 'Economic Growth and Social Capital', *Political Studies*, 48:3, 443–66.
- Wuttke, Alexander, Christian Schimpf, and Harald Schoen (2020). 'When the Whole is Greater Than the Sum of its Parts. On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Populist Attitudes and Other Multi-dimensional Constructs', *American Political Science Review*, 114:1, 356–74.

Online appendix to: Populism as a Problem of Social Trust? A Comparative Analysis.

Description of six country study (sample description)

The data was collected between 17 April and 11 May 2020 by Qualtrics through a web-based survey with around 1,000 respondents per country based on quota-sampling for sex, age and education. Our full sample consists of 6,028 respondents with an average age of 48 years and of which 49.6 percent are women. Regarding education, all groups are represented with primary and lower secondary education comprising around 25 percent, upper secondary 39 percent and tertiary education around 36 percent of respondents.

Table A1 Countries and right-wing populist parties

Country	Right-wing populist party
<i>Austria</i>	<i>FPÖ</i>
<i>Bulgaria</i>	<i>Attack</i> <i>VMRO</i> <i>VOLYA</i> <i>National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria</i>
<i>Czech Republic</i>	<i>SPD</i>
<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Danish Peoples Party</i> <i>The New Right</i>
<i>Estonia</i>	<i>EKRE</i>
<i>Finland</i>	<i>Finns Party</i>
<i>France</i>	<i>France arise</i> <i>National Front</i> <i>Other ring-wing extremist parties</i>
<i>Germany</i>	<i>AfD</i>
<i>Hungary</i>	<i>Fidesz</i> <i>Christian Democratic people's party;</i> <i>Jobbik</i>
<i>Italy</i>	<i>Leaga</i> <i>Fratelli d'Italia</i>
<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>PVV</i> <i>forum for democracy</i>
<i>Norway</i>	<i>Progress Party</i>
<i>Poland</i>	<i>PiS</i>
<i>Romania</i>	<i>Greater Romania Party</i>
<i>Slovakia</i>	<i>Slovak National Party</i> <i>We are family</i>
<i>Slovenia</i>	<i>Slovenian National Party</i> <i>Slovenian Democratic Party</i>
<i>Spain</i>	<i>Vox*</i>
<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Sweden Democrats</i>
<i>Switzerland</i>	<i>SVP</i> <i>Ticino League</i> <i>Movement of french-speaking Switzerland</i>
<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>UKIP</i>

Sources: Rooduijn et al. 2019; EVS (2019) ; Anonymous (2020). *Only in the six-country study

Table A2 Question wording for attitudinal items

Variables	Question wording
Populist attitudes	<i>Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:</i>
People centrism	“The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country’s politics.” “Politicians don’t have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job.”
Anti-elitism	“The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people.” “Government officials use their power to try to improve people’s lives.” “I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialised politician.” “The particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of the people.”
Manichean outlook	“You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics.” “The people I disagree with politically are not evil.” “The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed.” 1 Strongly disagree 2 rather disagree 3 neither disagree...nor agree 4 rather agree 5 strongly agree
Nativism	<i>There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries who come to settle in [country]. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?</i> Immigrants take jobs away from the real [country natives] Immigrants increase crime rates. Immigrants generally undermine the national culture of [country]. 1 Strongly disagree 2 rather disagree 3 neither disagree...nor agree 4 rather agree 5 strongly agree
Authoritarianism	<i>To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?</i> We need strong leaders so that we can live safely in society. The welfare of the national community should take precedence over our own individual interests. Troublemakers should be made to feel that they are not welcome in society. 1 Strongly disagree 2 rather disagree 3 neither disagree...nor agree 4 rather agree 5 strongly agree
Particularised trust (six country study)	How much do you trust people from various groups? Please indicate with a score of 1 to 7, where 1 means “do not trust at all” and 7 means “trust completely” whether you trust people from each group. How much do you trust Your family? ... Your friends?
Identity-based trust (six country study)	And now to the people that you do not know personally and meet for the first time. How much do you trust these people if they speak the same language as you? ... they have the same nationality as you?

Generalised Trust (six country study)	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Using a scale on which 1 means that you can't be too careful in dealing with people and 7 means that most people can be trusted, where would you locate yourself on this scale? How much do you trust people from various groups? Please indicate with a score of 1 to 7, where 1 means "do not trust at all" and 7 means "trust completely" whether you trust people from each group. How much do you trust people you meet for the first time?
Particularised trust (EVS)	We would like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Please indicate how much you trust... ... Your family? ... people you know personally?
Identity-based trust (six country study)	And now to the people that you do not know personally and meet for the first time. How much do you trust these people if they speak the same language as you? ... they have the same nationality as you?
Generalised Trust (six country study)	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? We would like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Please indicate how much you trust... ... people you meet for the first time?

Notes: Items adapted from Akkerman et al. (2014), Castanho Silva et al. (2018), van Hauwaert et al. (2019), Source: Anonymous 2020

Table A3 Factor analysis of social trust (six country study)

Items	Particularised Trust	Identity-based Trust	Generalised Trust
"Trust in family"	0.5248		
"Trust in friends"	0.9896		
"Trust in people with same nationality"		0.9034	
"Trust in people who speak same language"		0.9884	
"Trust in a generalised other"			0.3672
"Trust in people met for first time"			0.9256

Notes: Range of the items is 1 (do not trust at all) to 7 (trust a lot), with the exception of trust in a generalised other, which ranges from 1 (you cannot be too careful) to 7 (most people can be trusted); factor analysis with maximum-likelihood estimation and promax rotation. Source: Anonymous (2020).

Table A4 Factor analysis of social trust (EVS)

Items	Particularised Trust	Identity-based Trust	Generalised Trust
“Trust in family”	0.4946		
“Trust in people known personally”	0.4288		
“Trust in people with same nationality”		0.6574	
“Trust in people with same religion”		1.0316	
“Trust in a generalised other”			0.5497
“Trust in people met for first time”			0.7564

Notes: Range of the items is 1 (do not trust at all) to 4 (trust completely), with the exception of trust in a generalised other, which ranges from 0 (you cannot be too careful) to 1 (most people can be trusted); factor analysis with maximum-likelihood estimation and promax rotation. Source: EVS (2019).

Table A5 Dimensionality of Social Trust - Model Fit EVS (19 countries)

Model	Chi-squared	SRMR	RMSEA	TLI	CFI	AIC
A: One Dimension	11531.771	0.079	0.159	0.803	0.868	365033.208
B: Two Dimensions	5930.17	0.059	0.119	0.891	0.932	359433.606
C: Three Dimensions	660.1	0.020	0.043	0.986	0.993	354167.536

Notes: N = 32,401 SRMR = standardised root mean square residual; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; CFI = comparative fit index; AIC = Akaike information criterion.

Table A6 Summary statistics for six-country study

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Right-wing populist attitudes	6028	.21	.15	0	1
Populist attitudes	6028	.36	.15	0	1
Nativist attitudes	6028	.49	.29	0	1
Authoritarian attitudes	6028	.71	.19	0	1
Right-wing populist party preference	5168	.16	.37	0	1
Particularised Trust	6028	5.57	1.24	1	7
Identity-based Trust	6028	3.67	1.42	1	7
Generalised Trust	6028	3.26	1.31	1	7
Age	6028	48.46	16.55	18	88
Sex	6028	.50	.5	0	1
Education	6028	2.11	.78	1	3
Primary & lower secondary	1,523				
Upper, post secondary	2,343				
Tertiary	2,162				
Income	5985	2.93	1.09	1	5
<i>It is very difficult to cope on my current income.</i>	700				
<i>It is difficult to cope on my current income.</i>	1112				
<i>I can cope on my current income.</i>	2604				
<i>I can live comfortably on my current income.</i>	1039				
<i>I can live comfortably on my current income and can save regularly</i>	530				
Subjective social status	6028	5.28	1.92	0	10
Satisfaction with democracy	6028	4.08	1.67	1	7
Left-right-self-placement	6028	4.88	2.35	0	10
Observations	6028				

Source: Anonymous (2020).

Table A7 Summary statistics for EVS

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Right-wing populist party preference	20424	.16	.37	0	1
Particularised Trust	20424	3.62	.41	1	4
Identity-based Trust	20424	2.21	.69	1	4
Generalised Trust	20424	.55	.43	0	1
Age	20424	51.98	17.33	18	82
Sex	20424	.48	.5	0	1
Education	20424	4.10	1.89	0	8
Households total net income	20424	5.49	2.79	1	10
Left-right-self-placement	20424	5.44	2.25	1	10
Satisfaction with democracy	20424	5.97	2.45	1	10
Observations	20424				

Table A8 Linear regression model for right-wing populist attitudes and right-wing populist party preference (six country study)

	DV: Right-wing populist attitudes	DV: Right-wing populist party preference
Particularised Trust	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.004)
Identity-based Trust	0.016*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.004)
Generalised Trust	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.012** (0.005)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003* (0.002)
Age (squared)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Sex		
Male	0.007** (0.004)	0.008 (0.009)
Education		
Upper, post-secondary	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.004 (0.013)
Tertiary	-0.042*** (0.005)	-0.026** (0.012)
Income		
It is difficult to cope on my current income.	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.02 (0.018)
I can cope on my current income.	-0.021*** (0.007)	0.016 (0.017)
I can live comfortably on my current income.	-0.04*** (0.008)	0.007 (0.02)
I can live comfortably on my current income and can save regularly.	-0.048*** (0.009)	-0.008 (0.022)
Subjective social status	0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.036*** (0.003)
Left-right-self-placement	0.006** (0.003)	-0.011** (0.005)
Left-right-self-placement (squared)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.001)
Constant	0.226*** (0.020)	0.083* (0.048)
Observations	5985	5145
Country fixed-effects	✓	✓
R ²	0.216	0.283
Adjusted R ²	0.213	0.28

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reference category (RF)

for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Income: It is very difficult to cope on my current income. Source: Anonymous (2020).

Table A9 Linear probability model on right-wing populist party preference (EVS)

	DV: Right-wing populist party preference
Particularised Trust	0.007 (0.007)
Identity-based Trust	0.054*** (0.004)
Generalised Trust	-0.062*** (0.007)
Age	0.006*** (0.001)
Age (squared)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Sex	
Male	0.026*** (0.004)
Education	-0.015*** (0.001)
Household income	-0.004*** (0.001)
Left-right-self-placement	-0.002 (0.004)
Left-right-self-placement (squared)	0.004*** (0.000)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.006*** (0.001)
Constant	-0.038 (0.038)
Observations	20424
Country fixed-effects	✓
R^2	0.261
Adjusted R^2	0.260

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Reference category (RF) for sex: female; source: EVS (2019).

Table A10 Linear regression model for each sub-dimension of right-wing populist attitudes (six country study)

	DV: Populist attitudes	DV: Authoritarianism	DV: Nativism
Particularised Trust	-0.011*** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.008)	-0.071*** (0.012)
Identity-based Trust	0.011*** (0.002)	0.034*** (0.009)	0.095*** (0.012)
Generalised Trust	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.093*** (0.01)	-0.151*** (0.015)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.018*** (0.003)	0.034*** (0.005)
Age (squared)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Sex			
Male	0.011*** (0.004)	0.060*** (0.019)	0.008 (0.027)
Education			
Upper, post-secondary	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.138*** (0.035)
Tertiary	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.069*** (0.026)	-0.426*** (0.037)
Income			
It is difficult to cope on my current income.	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.089** (0.037)	-0.061 (0.052)
I can cope on my current income.	-0.013** (0.007)	-0.103*** (0.034)	-0.099** (0.049)
I can live comfortably on my current income.	-0.032*** (0.008)	-0.169*** (0.041)	-0.224*** (0.058)
I can live comfortably on my current income and can save regularly.	-0.053*** (0.009)	-0.177*** (0.049)	-0.253*** (0.068)
Subjective social status	0.001 (0.001)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.009)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.018*** (0.001)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.089*** (0.01)
Left-right-self-placement	-0.026*** (0.003)	0.063*** (0.014)	0.15*** (0.019)
Left-right-self-placement (squared)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002 (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)
Constant	0.548*** (0.021)	1.701*** (0.106)	1.390*** (0.154)
Observations	5985	5985	5985
Country fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓
R ²	0.142	0.154	0.275
Adjusted R ²	0.139	0.151	0.272

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. reference category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Income: It is very difficult to cope on my current income. Source: Anonymous (2020).

Table A11 Linear regression model for right-wing populist attitudes with controls for the Coronavirus pandemic (six country study)

	Corona-Model 1	Corona-Model 2	Corona-Model 3
DV: Right-wing populist attitudes			
Particularised Trust	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)
Identity-based Trust	0.015*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)
Generalised Trust	-0.021*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.018*** (0.002)
Fear of infection with Coronavirus	0.026*** (0.007)	-	-
Know people with Coronavirus			
Yes	-	0.01*** (0.004)	-
Personal threat of Coronavirus	-	-	0.007*** (0.001)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Age (squared)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Sex			
Male	0.006* (0.004)	0.008** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)
Education			
Upper, post-secondary	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.005)
Tertiary	-0.046*** (0.005)	-0.043*** (0.005)	-0.043*** (0.005)
Income			
It is difficult to cope on my current income.	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.013* (0.007)
I can cope on my current income.	-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.020*** (0.007)
I can live comfortably on my current income.	-0.036*** (0.008)	-0.040*** (0.008)	-0.037*** (0.008)
I can live comfortably on my current income and can save regularly.	-0.039*** (0.009)	-0.047*** (0.009)	-0.042*** (0.009)
Subjective social status	0.002 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.001)
Left-right-self-placement	0.008*** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)
Left-right-self-placement (squared)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Constant	0.212*** (0.022)	0.224*** (0.020)	0.203*** (0.021)
Observations	5115	5979	5985
Country fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓
R ²	0.231	0.217	0.222
Adjusted R ²	0.228	0.214	0.219

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reference Category (RF) for Know people with Coronavirus: No; RF for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Income: It is very difficult to cope on my current income. Source: Anonymous (2020).